

ATTACHMENT 1

Speech to business lunch, 11am 4 February 2009

With Prime Minister John Key

Prime Minister, Ministers, colleagues and friends,

It is fitting that Waitakere plays host to today's major announcements. This is, after all, your territory.

You are our local PM - our Prime Minister. In fact the first time the West had had a resident Prime Minister since Michael Joseph Savage.

That has been a long-awaited speech.

Make no mistake, recession is here, it is biting....

and it is going to get worse before it gets better.

This Government has committed to business, and today we see the Government taking real leadership.

For that, Prime Minister, we thank you.

The West is made up of small to medium sized businesses.

80% of our economy is made up of businesses employing 10 people or less.

Yes, we have some large, very successful and high profile enterprises, such as those in the boat building industry.

But it's the five and ten-staff teams that are the life-blood of our economy.

In Waitakere City, small business is led by large projects.

Big subdivisions. Big export orders. Big films. Big boats.

When the big jobs fall, hundreds of small firms worry.

When hundreds of small firms worry, hundreds of thousands of staff worry.

Today we have heard how Government will take some of that worry, and some of that uncertainty away.

I am here to announce Waitakere's own recovery package.

Here in Waitakere, we provide support through Waitakere Enterprise - our hosts today.

Thanks to Bryan, John and his team.

We also support the economy through our contracts and capital works programmes. These deliver thousands of jobs and millions of dollars back into the local economy.

These examples will all come into production this year.

The first is New Lynn transit station. This is \$300 million of funding from a variety of sources. It's also 300 construction jobs on site now. That part is being constructed by Fletchers.

But by June you will see tenders out for \$20 million of roadworks associated with this. I want to see local firms bidding for this work.

By the end of February we will also announce another set of funding from NZTA. Watch this space.

The second is the New Lynn civic development. In the first half of this year, our partners Infratil will unveil a project to demolish and rebuild the entire centre of New Lynn. It will integrate with the transit station. This is the first true public private partnership launched under this new government. We are inviting the government to launch this with us.

MI

The next is Hobsonville Land Company. By October this year, Stage 1 of Hobsonville will be under construction. This is New Zealand's largest single development of any kind. It is like the entire town of Blenheim moving up and being built from scratch.

You will already see H.E.B construction hard at work on State Highway 16 and 18 across the northwest. Many firms in this room will be subbing to that job. That's \$220 million of public money and 160 jobs on site already. Prime Minister, amongst all the uncertainty, we are providing certainty and delivery.

Thanks to government and local government in partnership.

The next part of the recovery plan is Westgate, with our partners at the New Zealand Retail Property Group. They are undertaking \$600 million worth of work on another new town centre. The first stage alone is worth \$100 million. This is a greenfields site, so contractors, start your engines.

Finally, I am also announcing today that Waitakere Enterprise will be launching a campaign to contact five thousand business to plan their business and ensure each of them are linked to a private equity network.

We all know that capital is hard to come by, so we are pulling out all the stops to link every business to capital.

In conclusion, Prime Minister, these are not pie in the sky projects.

They are underway or about to kick-off and demonstrate the very real commitment that this Council- this City- has to economic development.

They show local government and central government working hard at it together.

Because together with yourselves, Prime Minister, and the commitment of small and medium businesses, we can get through these tough times.

Out here in the west, like you Prime Minister, we are in this for the long haul.

That's what the west is known for....when the going gets tough, the tough get going.

Ends.

M2

ATTACHMENT 2

AUCKLAND 2060

A paper prepared for the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance

By **Rod Oram**

Adjunct Professor, Business School, Unitec

Auckland Anniversary Day, Monday, 26 January 206010

Dawn

After the vicious cyclone overnight, dawn breaks gently to the ebullient calls of the birds. The light spreads rapidly across the huge city and its beautiful hinterland of bush and beach. Any of the volcanic cones offers a good view of this sweeping panorama across our thriving Auckland region. Mount Hobson, though - close to the historic heart of the city where water and land, our two abundant sources of wealth, meet - has a special place in the region's story. Today is Auckland's Anniversary Day. And Mount Hobson is named after the man who decreed it an annual holiday for the Auckland Province. That was 218 years ago. But if Hobson were standing up on this namesake cone this morning, he would still readily recognise this wide vista across the Waitemata Harbour and to the scattering of islands beyond.

If his eyes were sharp, he'd spot small boats drifting in the lee of Rangitoto. If he thought those people were fishing, he'd be right. Over the years, we've learnt lots about restoring the ecosystem of our Hauraki Gulf Marine Park.

But he'd be puzzled if he looked down below Mount Hobson. When Ngāti Whātua, the first settlers here, offered him the pick of the harbour's land to build a new city, he chose a graceful string of little hills and bays at the foot of this volcano.

Now, a flat, angular shoreline reaches out into the harbour. Landfill a century or more ago formed the extra land to accommodate a booming city. It remains today home to many people, businesses, and recreational activities. In recent decades, though, we've made it one of the most admired waterfronts in the world.

Last night's storm, though, had the emergency services out. As expected, climate change has brought a 40-cm rise in sea level in the past 50 years. And weather events are more extreme and frequent. The good news is temperatures are only a couple of degrees higher.

We've built well to adapt but we always worry about storm surges. And we worry a lot about the unexpected. Just a month ago, severe earth tremors along the Kerepehi Fault - under the Hauraki Plain and into the Firth of Thames - caused a series of small tsunamis. They did a lot of damage both sides - Seabird Coast and the Coromandel - and up to the eastern beaches of Waiheke.

Despite the severity of last night's cyclone, the waterfront has suffered no damage. We live well with the sea. And so we should. We're Oceanic People. That's how we see ourselves these days.¹⁸ All our ancestors, Māori, Pākehā, Pacific peoples, Asians, Africans - indeed, members of almost every major ethnic group on the planet - travelled from afar to build this nation, this city, and to create our distinctive, multistranded culture.

Yet, for the first century-and-a-half after Hobson, we poured our energy and ambitions into the land. While we enjoyed our coastal waters, the vast oceans still separated us from the rest of the world. Even in the early decades of air travel and instant global communications, we still struggled to make a living, play a role in the wider world.

Our fortunes reached their lowest ebb late in the past century and early this. Dependent on commodity exports, we were short of money and ambition. We wanted only incremental change. We tried to build this nation and city in a piecemeal way that always lagged, never led the great forces reshaping global society. It took the first great oil and food shocks to make the citizens of the world realise how radically we all needed to change. In the decades since, we and the rest of the world have achieved by far the most profound and fastest transformation of technology, environmental practices, economic models, and governance structures humankind has ever attempted.

Here in New Zealand, we earn most of our income, as we always have, in ways that depend on our natural environment. But it is a far bigger, more sustainable living, thanks to our advances in the science and management skills we apply to our natural resources. We've seized many of the opportunities presented by this century's global turmoil.

Three international conferences this week here in Auckland will reflect on the lessons we've learnt with our most important successes. We have become world leaders in all three sets of skills. People look to us for leadership on how to rise to the endless challenges ahead.

The first will focus on the future of our global lacto-pharmaceutical industry, led by our dairy sector as it moved from commodities into very high value, sophisticated products. It was a long, hard journey. It took thoughtful public debate and good governance to get Aucklanders used to the idea of having such high-technology labs and factories in their neighbourhoods. And to get them behind winning these investments against stiff competition from many other international cities. The second conference is about the unique model of mini-multinational businesses we have pioneered. These small, highly entrepreneurial companies are successful in global markets. They are adept at investing in research, manufacturing, and sales in key markets around the world. But they have a nimble, collaborative style born of their New Zealand culture and ingenuity. We've proved it's possible for small companies from small economies to thrive globally. So for many decades now, we've been showing other people how to adapt the model to their own cultures and economies. The leader in this, the UN's centre for developing mini-multinationals, is based here in Auckland and is hosting the conference. The third event is a summit on our seabed sciences and management of the ocean commons. Our voyage began in 2006 when New Zealand submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf the outline of our claim to a 200- nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone.

When our claim was eventually granted, we became responsible for an oceanic area nine times greater than our land mass, some 4 million square kilometres, thanks to our craggy coastline and many distant small islands. By comparison, Australia's EEZ is only twice ours because of its simpler coastline. Our EEZ brings us great wealth from fisheries and minerals. But it also presents big demands in terms of protection and careful management of its intensely complex ecosystems. News overnight of another shipload of eco-refugees²⁵ from the Pacific Islands beaching on Great Barrier Island will only inflame debate. We're sharply divided on how many refugees we can settle and where we should build the next series of naval and air bases we need to help us protect our zone. One of the mooted air base sites is up north at Bream Bay, between the Brynderwyn Hills and Whangarei. And the naval base could be part of the NorthPort expansion to Marsden Point, a bit further up the coast.

These days Whangarei is only 50 minutes by train from Britomart. And that's with a couple of stops on the North Shore. The network and its interconnecting motorway system have been a big help with urban development. They've quite changed how and here we live. In addition to the route down from the north, a second line runs east to Tauranga and Whakatane and a third runs south through Hamilton, Rotorua, and Taupo and on down to Wellington. This road and rail system has allowed us to develop our towns, old ones and some new ones, into beautiful, compact, eco-urban areas, each close to bush and beach. All up, 3.4 million of us live in this "string of pearls" as we call them. About 2.2 million here in greater Auckland and 1.2 million from Whangarei around to Whakatane and down to Taupo.

Another 850,000 live elsewhere in the North Island and 1.35 million in the South Island making 5.6 million for the nation. That's a big change from the start of the new millennium when the Auckland region was only just over 1 million and the country 4 million.

The region's urban area had grown very fast after the Second World War. But the density was very low, lower even than Los Angeles. Everybody wanted his or her quarter acre. Nobody was keen to pay for the infrastructure so we always ended up expensively retrofitting it piecemeal long after we needed it.

What changed things? A whole bunch of things, really. Frustration with delays and failures, a strong sense we weren't on top of our economic and social problems. Those were two big ones. But it was the energy and economic shocks some 50 years ago that finally brought people together. We realised we had to rethink how we lived, worked, and governed ourselves. These were issues everybody the world over was wrestling with, and still are. A growing population over the past 50 years gave plenty of scope for reshaping the urban landscape. We've doubled the number of homes in Auckland and we've replaced about a quarter of the old, badly built ones. New building materials have helped, particularly the timber laminates and composite bioplastics that have displaced much of the steel and concrete even in tall buildings. Given all that new construction, we've been able to remake this into a very liveable, eco-city. Getting a high concentration of homes and workplaces around the rail and road networks has allowed us to keep the urban area relatively compact. This has helped us develop more diverse neighbourhoods with more amenities and more opportunities to work at home or in local businesses.

This vibrancy across the region ensures people still do plenty of travelling for work, entertainment, education, socialising, and recreation. And that in turn has helped develop a stronger sense of regional identity.

The remaking of much of the urban area has also given us the chance to create more open spaces and green corridors. Lots of regeneration of native plants in those places and in people's gardens has attracted flocks of native birds from the island sanctuaries out in the Hauraki Gulf. Even kiwis nest on Mount Hobson and the other volcanic cones we turned into true nature reserves protected by predator-proof fences.

The city has evolved in many other ways too. For example, buildings and neighbourhoods do some of their own power generation, water capture, and waste treatment. These partially self-supporting local systems are linked through automated networks for the rest of their needs.

This has taken a lot of pressure off the highly centralised services, freeing them up in part for other uses. One showcase is the Mangere water treatment plant. From the algae it grows in its waste-processing stream, it makes enough biofuel for one-third of our vehicles. The other two-thirds, of course, are electric. How could we afford all this investment? We could because we played our part to pioneer some of the big new technologies: cellulosic ethanol from trees as a second generation biofuel; lacto-pharmaceuticals; and telepresencing, which gives us multisensory, real-time connection with people around the world, overcoming much of our sense of isolation.

Overseas investment has played its part too. For example, SinoBioChem came to explore for oil shortly after we signed our 2008 free trade agreement with China. Their consortium found our first billion-barrel oilfield in the Great South Basin, off Stewart Island.

With prices sky high, they pumped like crazy. But when they failed to find any more fields, they wised up. The crude had some special qualities so they saved the rest for feedstock for the very high-value pharmaceuticals, plastics, and other compounds they make down at Bluff. As they ramped up their investment in science, manufacturing, and commercial operations around the country, SinoBioChem's Australasian-South Pacific headquarters grew here in Auckland. Its presence is one of many reasons that

Mandarin is widely taught in local schools these days. We've also done well growing many of our own international companies across a range of industries. But we've also lost some. The biggest blow was Fonterra's decision to move its global headquarters to Singapore in 2017. It argued it needed to be nearer to its customers and its rapidly growing number of farmers overseas. You couldn't run a major multinational from down here, it said.

But it came back. What happened was a new chief executive took over Fonterra about 10 years after it went offshore. He was a Kiwi who'd had a great career at Nestlé but he was pipped for the top post so Fonterra headhunted him. But he'd come to realise how important Nestlé's corporate culture was, a powerful blend of its Swiss origins and European, American, and Asian influences. And being true to its roots was the absolute key to creating this strong, unique, global culture for staff from 140 countries. Nestlé has had its headquarters in Vevey, a town on Lake Geneva, since the 1870s. It grew to be the world's largest food company. Yet, its home town was only one third the size of Invercargill was before we had our oil boom. Now Vevey's about a fifth the size. So, Fonterra came home from its OE and has never looked back. While it has remained a global dairy commodity producer and seller, it needed to find a much higher value, more specialised role for dairy farmers here. They could no longer compete in commodity markets. So Fonterra used its strong cash flow from commodities to invest heavily in research, becoming one of the world leaders in making pharmaceuticals from compounds within milk. Its senior executives, a mini-UN of nationalities, enjoy being based here in Auckland.

Growing businesses remains a challenge, particularly as the science becomes ever more demanding. When things go wrong, though, they can do so in spectacular fashion. Last week, a nano-biotechnology plant in Rodney suffered a serious failure. A huge global response kicked in almost instantaneously. Thanks to the power of Web 17.0, our emergency services were helped from around the world to model the potential disaster in real-time in virtual reality. So, thankfully no crisis developed. A monitoring drone is still hovering high in the sky over the site. It's directing the army of robots still seeking out and capturing the escaped nano-particles with the help of overseas expertise.

This is just one demonstration of collective, global intelligence and decision making, the sorts of skills we apply to hugely complex issues such as ecosystem measuring and monitoring.

Morning

The Mayor, splendid in sari and chains of office, fires the starting gun for a large class of little boats in the Auckland Day Regatta. The President had done the honours for the biggest boats earlier in the morning. The Mayor is standing far above the boats on the bridge of one of the city's fast ferries. These whisk people up the harbour, almost as quick as the train, to North City, the new centre for the north shore built three decades ago at Whenuapai. And we've done well revitalising this old part of town where Hobson staked out Auckland more than 200 years ago. Beginning early this century, we started opening vistas through the city right up to the ridge at K Road. This helped re-reveal the topography of the city, its natural skeleton and form. Studded with art works and other delights, they help integrate the old city on a very human scale.

Viewed from the water, the city offers fine vistas. One is the diagonal from Viaduct Harbour past the spire of St Matthew-in-the-City to the top of Symonds Street. It took 30 years to create as buildings along its line were gradually redeveloped. People are thronging the waterfront by the old ferry building, as they are all the way from the iconic entertainment complex in the Wynyard Wharf park right along to the new ocean passenger terminal in Mechanics Bay.

Regatta Day is one of many festivals through the year. One of the most popular is the WaterFire Festival at Matariki. We borrowed the idea 50 years or so ago from Providence, Rhode Island, in the United States. But we've made it our own. On the longest night of the year, seven huge floating fire sculptures, representing the seven stars of Matariki/Pleiades, are anchored 100 m off the waterfront.

From sunset to past midnight, black-clad performers in torch-lit boats quietly tend the fires while music from around the world plays along the waterfront. Despite it being a long and usually chill evening, many hardy souls linger in cafes, bars, and parks until about half an hour before dawn. Then they gaze at the northeast horizon, watching Matariki rising. It is such a wonderfully contemplative, hopeful time of year, of new plantings, of new beginnings.

Today's almost as busy on the waterfront. Many of the people are heading into the main square for a referendum rally. This coming week is the next monthly vote and it's a very big one: on the region's next 20-year eco-budget.

This is causing a lot of soul-searching. Since we learnt how to precisely monitor our role in the ecosystem, we've set and met demanding goals. Thanks to this, better technology and the likes of closed-cycle manufacturing and resource processes, we've allowed the ecosystem to recover some of its health. We think we're back up to 1985 levels but we aren't sure because our knowledge was so limited then. It's always taken us a long time and a lot of debate to agree on these budgets. And then a lot of discipline, reinforced by stiff penalties, to keep them. They underpin every environmental, economic, and social policy we implement. Yet they have delivered what a lot of people said they wanted - a healthy environment, a cohesive society, and a robust economy. There was a time when many believed that was impossible.

This sentiment came to light more than 50 years ago in the work of Landcare Research. It spent several years on a big future-thinking exercise. With a high degree of unanimity, citizens involved in the study said they wanted to live in a wealthy, sustainable society in all senses of the word: environmental, economic, cultural, and social. But they expected they'd get the opposite.

Many factors have helped us get what we want rather than what we feared. But crucially, local governance was ambitious in its strategies, efficient in its operations, and responsive to its citizens.

While we have achieved a lot as a region, the debate over our next eco-budget has inevitably given voice to a wide range of opinions. One of our most successful international entrepreneurs is campaigning for more flexible goals. He says our decision making is too slow, our adoption of new technology too timid, and our independent line in international bodies too risky. If we don't change course, he says he'll move his operations to Singapore.

At the other end of the spectrum, a fair few people are as unhappy as ever with our engagement with the world and use of the environment. We're doing well on most of the measures in the global Genuine Progress Indicator, which benchmarks us against a wide range of economic, environmental, and society factors. But some people want an even stricter eco-budget just to be sure we're doing the right thing by the planet. Some of them even want to shut down the WaterFire Festival because of the CO2 emissions from the fire sculptures.

All these views and many more matter. Thanks to the power of communications, we citizens are truly empowered. We aren't voting in this referendum on an eco-budget proposed by politicians or bureaucrats. We will shape and agree it together online, just as we first learned to do in much simpler forms with collective knowledge banks such as the very first, Wikipedia. What we decide, our local government implements.

Most people are pretty savvy these days. They know the prices of fresh water, carbon, amino acids, precious metals for fuel cells, and all the other resource commodities traded on the global enviro-markets. They know we need to conserve very carefully, particularly given the increasing volatility of the markets.

They had a timely reminder with this morning's shocks through global markets. This time, it was triggered by fears for Pacific fisheries after this week's series of cyclones right up to Hawaii.

Noon

A very special bunch of young people has gathered in one of Waitakere's libraries. They are taking part in a great, old international competition that challenges secondary school students to solve our future problems. Ten Kiwi teams, winners of categories in the hard-fought national competition, are competing live but virtually in the Global Future Problem Solving Competition being held this year in Bangalore, India.

This year, they have been set a particularly tough challenge, one our scientists are working on. "Given that animal protein is in very short supply in the world, that feeding animals remains an energy-inefficient way to grow protein and that we can grow meat in laboratories from stem cells,⁵⁷ what are the ethical, environmental, economic, and social issues about using this technology and banning animal farming?"

New Zealand teams have consistently done well in global future problem solving competitions because they think differently. Our teams have long had students from all sorts of ethnic backgrounds. Pākehā, for example, ceased to be a majority of the population in Auckland back in 2016. And many team members down through the years have been recent immigrants. Yet, we learnt to rapidly acculturate them into New Zealand while they bring their own distinctive knowledge and insights to us. And this library venue for this year's competition is a story in itself. Back in the early days of the internet, librarians realised the revolutionary technology was turning their world inside out. People might still come in for a few books. But increasingly, they were reaching out to the world for information. Yes, they could do that from computers at home or office. But libraries learnt to offer more. They helped to make sense of distant information and helped to create, share, and keep local knowledge. They are pulsing places of creativity and communication, locally and with the world. In a rapidly homogenising world where one culture ever more melds with another, they demonstrate the enduring power of sharing and learning together in our own distinctive way.

The community board did a great job helping to turn this library into one of the best in the country. Drawing on its local support, powers and ample financial resources from local government, it brought together this library and local schools in life-long learning and storytelling for the community.

Across the region, these boards play a powerful role. At the last local government election, candidates from more than 60 ethnicities gained seats on council and community boards. These non-Pākehā representatives are the majority overall but not on some boards. In terms of representation, the biggest problem these days is getting more men to stand.

Thanks to these boards, many of our communities have developed strong senses of local purpose and identity. They keep building on their diverse ethnicities, particularly through local projects, festivals, and events. They are many and varied. So, sweetness and light dawn across the region? Far from it.

Crime, racial tension, and social deprivation still rack some of our neighbourhoods. Don't blame the communities. Many of their boards have helped improve the delivery of devolved social services. But, as ever, society as a whole still struggles to help all progress.

Afternoon

In mid-afternoon, a large crowd gathers at the marae at the heart of the Unitec campus in Mount Albert. Completed 50 years ago, the whare whakairo (carved meeting house) is an intriguing blend of traditional building techniques and modern sustainability technology. Its carvings and other art works tell the interwoven story of Māori and Pākehā in our region, Tāmaki-makau-rau, down through more than 200 years.

Today, the marae is hosting many people for a great celebration of a great person. They soon fill the ātea in front of the whare. Everyone has some connection with each other, given it's so easy in a tiny country such as ours for people to work together. But this is a particularly rich network. In chronological order from the beginning of the saga the gathering includes:

- long-term survivors from a Māori diabetes self-care programme that started in Auckland
- the now elderly medical researchers and doctors who pioneered the early diagnosis tools, drugs, and therapies that tackled the disease, as well as the community health workers who developed the self-care and prevention programmes that combated the raging epidemic
- the Ngāti Whātua entrepreneurs who developed these skills and intellectual property into a diabetes prevention business they took national, then international via floating their company on the New York Stock Exchange.

In its early days, the latter company went through a business school programme for enterprises born with global ambitions. A dozen other start-ups were in its cohort on the programme. The founders of many of them are here today because they too have become successfully internationally. They exemplify the unique business model we've developed in New Zealand: mini-multinational companies that play to their quintessential Kiwi strengths yet maximise their talents globally - hence the M3c designation by which the model is known.

M3 has been widely adapted and emulated by other small companies in other small countries seeking their fortunes in the global economy. M3Global, an Auckland-based organisation, has helped them along the journey. For many years now, it has taught the M3 skills here and in dozens of developed and developing countries. These days it also offers a virtual reality programme from Auckland.

At the centre of this scrum of people is a slight woman, in her late 60s, with an abundance of quiet, natural mana and a muckle of mokopuna around her. She is Min Te Ua, the founder and former head of research at M3Global. Today's celebration is in her honour.

Her husband, Haare te Ua, is trying to divert the kids. Haare's very good at rounding people up. He's chief executive of Ngāti Porou's 30,000 ha of permanent forests sink that his iwi set up on the East Cape back in 2006 as a joint venture with Sustainable Forestry Management of the UK.

Way back when Min was a shy young teenager not long after her family emigrated from Seoul, she was involved in the UpStart programme in South Auckland that still today helps kids in some of our toughest neighbourhoods develop their entrepreneurial skills.

Later as a university student, Min led a team that won the global Students in Free Enterprise competition two years in a row. Studying for her MBA, she began working with Māori entrepreneurs. Min then went overseas to earn her PhD in behavioural economics from the University of Chicago and then teach at University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and Chongqing68 Technology and Business University, Sichuan province, China.

When she came home to her Auckland alma mater after seven years abroad, she started a "going global" programme for small New Zealand companies attempting to build business overseas. The Ngāti Whātua start-up was in her first cohort. Over the next 20 years, M3Global developed a worldwide reach and reputation. Many of its alumni businesses from more than a dozen countries developed into sizable companies.

As a result, Min was invited to deliver a series of lectures on the role of small businesses in the global economy at the 2042 Earth Summit, the series of once-a-decade sustainable development conferences the UN had begun in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Min's speeches were electrifying. Soon afterwards, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation asked her to found a global equivalent of her organisation under the UN banner.

She was very keen to do so but it took nearly three years to get it up and running. The UN kept insisting on headquartering M3G in a developing country. But Min was adamant it had to be in Auckland. The people coming to M3G needed to get away, get a fresh perspective, learn some new things. Coming as far away as anybody could, all the way to New Zealand, was essential she said. Min eventually got her way. So tomorrow, she opens the United Nation's M3G conference downtown. More than 1,000 delegates have already arrived. This global whānau will be celebrating not just UN M3G's first 15 years. It will be honouring Min for the Nobel Prize for Economics she won last year. Her citation at the award ceremony in Stockholm early last December read in part: "Professor Min Park Te Ua's work has brought significant economic prosperity and social progress to both rich and poor societies alike. By pioneering business skills that enable small organisations to participate fully in the global economy, she has helped hundreds of millions of people fulfil much more of their potential. "Her work is distinguished by its intellectual rigour, its creativity, its practicality, its accessibility to people...and above all by its profound and fresh insights into the human relationships at the heart of economic and social progress."

Evening

In the Auckland Town Hall, a great occasion and some marvellous music is promised by the Auckland Philharmonia and its sister ensemble, the Leipzig Gewandhaus Orchestra. The hall is packed and Aotea Square is filling up quite nicely with the overflow, people who are happy enough with the outdoor screens. But this isn't the only show in town tonight. For example, there's a jazz festival down at the historic Villa Maria cellar and restaurant near Auckland International Airport. In addition to the music, they're offering a food and wine matching with some of the latest nutraceuticals, foods with medicinal benefits, from the nearby food innovation centre of excellence.

And then, of course, there's the All Blacks test tonight at Eden Park. It'll be a great game. The ABs are taking on the winners of last year's World Cup, Japan. A great row still rumbles on over the Japanese players' use of bio-mechanical enhancements. Ever the optimist, many people believe the ABs - "100% pure; no enhancements" - have a chance against the Japanese tonight. But if they win, nobody's sure they can keep up their form all the way through to the next World Cup in 2063 in Buenos Aires.

No doubt more than a few concert-goers will be keeping a discreet eye on the game via their unobtrusive retinal visualisers. The audience quietens as the members of the Leipzig Orchestra take the stage of the Town Hall. The Germans look so real, even though their holograms are beamed all the way from Leipzig. The gala concert tonight marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the link between the two orchestras. They bonded because of fascinating quirk of history. Our Town Hall was built 150 years ago as an exact replica of Leipzig's second Gewandhaus ("Cloth Hall"). It was chosen as the model because it had reputedly one of the best concert hall acoustics in Europe at the time. And we're still the beneficiaries today. That precious Leipzig landmark was destroyed by Allied bombers in 1944. In a very real sense our Town Hall is the living embodiment of it.

So back in 2010 when our Town Hall premiered the rebuilding of its massive pipe organ by the Johannes Klais Orgelbau workshop of Bonn, the Leipzig orchestra made their first trip down here to play. Of course, back then, they had to come in person. This evening's concert taps right into the roots of each orchestra's repertoire and identity. The Germans will do one of the Bach pieces they had on the programme of their concert in 1781 at the opening of the first Gewandhaus. It will be followed by a new work by a Turko-German composer. The Auckland Philharmonia will play an old favourite of local audiences, Gareth Farr's *From the Depths Sound the Sea Gongs*, and a new work by an Auckland composer featuring a prodigious array of Māori nose flutes and Chinese lutes. It will be interesting to watch the faces of the Leipzig audience, beamed in from their post-war Gewandhaus.

Over the past 50 years the two orchestras have worked very closely together, learning, inspiring, and supporting each other. The Leipzig orchestra's annual visit is a centrepiece of Auckland's international arts festival each July, which attracts large numbers of visitors and performers from around the world.

M10

A very unusual feature of the festival is the way it showcases collaborations between Aucklanders of various ethnic backgrounds with artists from their home countries such as Pacific peoples, Indians, and Chinese. The overseas visitors - artists and festival-goers - refresh our cultural roots; and we enrich them with South Pacific variations of their cultures.

Late Evening

Buoyed by the stimulating music, the audience leaves the hall and spills out on to Queen Street. One couple is approached by a pair of tourists seeking directions. It turns out they're from the Comoros Islands. While we all fly less than we used to, there are real benefits. These days, tourists typically come to New Zealand only once or twice in their lives but stay on average six weeks. They want to get to know us, share our lives.

The local couple offer to show the tourists the way down to the waterfront. They lead the way boarding the tram, although the husband is moving a little gingerly. He is waiting for his new pair of lungs. A lab in Otara is custom-growing them from his stem cells.

As they ride down Queen Street, a scuffle of people up Durham Street East catches their attention of the quartet. A bunch of young women are beating each other up, cheered on by a gang of drunken lads. Sirens wailing, lights flashing, a police car races up Queen Street. A couple of officers jump out to quell them. If they are first time offenders, they'll probably be given a spell helping out in the reception centre for eco-refugees.

Down the length of Queen Street, the lights are burning late in some of the office buildings. These are the trading floors of the big global enviro-trading firms and they are preparing for an anxious night. Markets have had a rough couple of trading days because of the series of storms across the Pacific. We play a crucial role as an international trading centre, thanks to the early start we made on carbon trading 50 years or so ago. So, it will be another stormy night - but this one financial rather than physical.

Yet, as day follows night, so the nocturnal calls of the kiwi on Mount Hobson will give way to the dawn chorus of chortling tuis, once again energising Aucklanders for a new and challenging day.

Selected bibliography

- Auckland Regional Council, *Regional Growth Strategy 2050*.
- Auckland Regional Council, *Draft Long Term Sustainability Framework for the Auckland Region (December 2006)*.
- Auckland Regional Council, *State of the Auckland Region Report 2004*.
- Auckland Regional Council, 2006 Census series: *Pacific Peoples; Immigration & Ethnicity; Housing & Households; Growth of Auckland*.
- Auckland Regional Growth Forum, *Auckland Sustainability Framework*
- CityScope Consultants, *Auckland's Population*, prepared for the Royal Commission.
- CityScope Consultants, *Transport Governance in Auckland: Situation Analysis*, prepared for the Royal Commission.
- Boston, Jonathan (editor), *Towards a New Climate Change Treaty: Looking beyond 2012*, Wellington: Victoria University Institute of Policy Studies, 2007.
- Carden, Steven, *New Zealand Unleashed: The country, its future and the people who will get it there*, Auckland: Random House, 2007.
- Covec, *Drivers of Economic Growth in Auckland*, prepared for the Royal Commission.
- Covec, *The Scope and Scale of Auckland's Economy*, prepared for the Royal Commission.
- Frame, R., Molisa, P., Taylor, R.E., Toia, H., and Liu, J.H., *100% Pure Conjecture: Accounts of our future state(s)*, Landcare Research.
- James, Colin and Edmonson, Claire, *Environmental Scanning: Looking into the Future for Statistics New Zealand 2006-2050*.
- Landcare Research, *Four Future Scenarios for New Zealand*, Edition 2, 2007.
- Liu, J.H., Frame, R., Molisa, P., Taylor, R.E., and Toia, H., *New Zealand Identities: departures and destinations*, Wellington: Victoria University Press.
- Landry, Charles, *The Art of City Making*, London: Earthscan, 2006.
- McDonough, William and Braungart, Michael, *Cradle to Cradle: Remaking The Way We Make Things*, New York, 2002.
- Marsh, Nick, McAllum, Mike, and Purcell, Dominique, "The Seven Tsunami Drivers of Change: Strategic Foresight - the power of standing in the future," NextCorporation.com.
- Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, *New Zealand's Quota Management System: A History of the First 20 Years*, April 2007.
- National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) report for the Ministry for the Environment, *Climate Change Effects and Impacts Assessment: A Guidance Manual for Local Government in New Zealand*, 2nd edition, May 2008.
- New Zealand Institute, *No Country is an Island*, November 2005.
- Oram, Rod, *Reinventing Paradise: How New Zealand is starting to earn a bigger, sustainable living in the world economy*, Auckland: Penguin, 2007.
- Shell, *Shell Energy Scenarios to 2050*.
- Statistics New Zealand, 2006 Census.
- Statistics New Zealand, *Demographic Trends: 2007*.
- Wallace, Mike and Adler, Bill (editors), *The Way We Will Be 50 Years From Today*, Thomas Nelson, Nashville, Tennessee, 2008.
- United Nations, The Millennium Project, *2007 State of the Future*, Washington D.C., 2007.
- United Nations, IPCC, *Climate Change 2007 Synthesis Report*.

Managing Middle Earth: The Evolving Role of Local Authority Chief Executive Officers in Auckland, New Zealand

ANDY ASQUITH

Department of Management and International Business, Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand

ABSTRACT *New Zealand is often seen as a 'test-bed' for public sector management reform. Indeed, much has been written about the machinery and operation of central government, yet little attention has been paid to the actors and institutions of local government. This article, using evidence obtained through a series of semi-structured interviews with serving and former Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the Auckland region, examines the impact upon local authority chief executives of two major reforms within local government. Firstly, the impact of sweeping managerial reforms in 1989, and then secondly reforms to reinvigorate and reinvent the scope and scale of local authorities in the period since 2002. The article argues that whilst local government CEOs in New Zealand are managerially strong, these skills need to be refocused to ensure maximum benefit for local government can be gained from post-2002 reforms.*

Background

This paper examines the role of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in New Zealand local government, with specific emphasis on those located in the greater Auckland conurbation. Internationally, local government CEOs have been the subject of either national or international comparative studies, however the New Zealand group has not been subject to such an investigation. This gap in the academic literature is all the more interesting given the development of the so-called 'New Zealand Model' of public sector managerialism and its subsequent application (Boston *et al.*, 1996).

Correspondence Address: Dr. Andy Asquith, Department of Management and International Business, Massey University, Private Bag 102904, North Shore MSC, Auckland, New Zealand.
Email: A.Asquith@massey.ac.nz

ISSN 0300-3930 Print/1743-9388 Online © 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/03003930802413871

A major international study was undertaken on behalf of the Union des Dirigeants Territoriaux de l'Europe (UDiTE or Association of the European Local Government Chief Executives) in the late 1990s. The UDiTE Leadership Study was conducted by an international team of researchers led by the University of Southern Denmark and resulted in a number of significant publications (Dahler-Larsen, 2002; Klausen & Magnier, 1998; Mouritzen & Svava, 2002). Other than the occasional Master's dissertation (Furness, 2002; Laing, 2001), little academic attention has been paid to this group of public servants in New Zealand. Indeed, it is striking that in two special editions of the academic journal *Political Science* in 1999 and 2004, dealing with 'Local Government in New Zealand' and 'Leadership in New Zealand' respectively, not a single article was concerned with the CEO in local government or his/her predecessor. This article seeks, at least in part, to fill this gap in the literature.

Alongside the rest of the public sector in NZ, local government has undergone (and is still undergoing) major change. To accommodate the relentless nature of the change, the role of the senior permanent official within each local authority has been transformed from that of essentially an administrator to one which requires managerial leadership. A wide body of literature both internationally (Hughes, 2003; Pollitt, 2003) and more specifically related to New Zealand (Boston *et al.*, 1996; Miller, 2003) serves to illustrate this trend.

The role attributed to the CEO in local authorities in NZ is a fairly recent phenomenon, resulting from the raft of managerialist or New Public Management reforms which swept the country during the 1980s. The Local Government Amendment Act (No.2) 1989 (LGAA (No.2) 1989) sought to introduce a managerialist zeal to local government authorities. Whilst the LGAA (No.2) 1989 offered local authorities the option of either a CEO as the managerial leader or a group of senior executive managers acting collectively, the latter was shunned (Bush, 1995). Every local authority opted to employ a CEO, and as such followed the corporatist model adopted by central government. The adoption of a private business sector model of leadership was seen as a prerequisite in order to implement the raft of managerialist reforms contained within the LGAA (No.2) 1989.

In the agenda of reform, traditional values, structures and practices of local authorities have been challenged by management models, the philosophical bases of which rest firmly within the private business sector (Hughes, 2003). Public administration has, to some extent, been replaced by public management. Traditional bureaucratic and administrative structures and organisations are perceived to be no longer valid in today's rapidly changing consumerist society.

The Weberian mode of running public sector organisations as bureaucracies was viewed as both outmoded and outdated. Whereas once public sector organisations were viewed as static institutions which did not change,

and existed solely to administer services characterised by continuity, public services now clearly exist in an increasingly volatile environment. Hence public services function within environments of growing levels of turbulence and are subject to the increasingly whimsical preferences of both elected politicians and service users. As such, services can now be said to have been reformed to embrace (to differing degrees) the concept of market mechanisms in order to enhance efficiency, quality and the idea of individual end-users or customers (Boston *et al.*, 1996). The raft of reforms have been collectively termed as 'new public management' (Hood, 1991) or 'managerialism' (Pollitt, 1993) and are international in their impact.

Methodology

An approach was made to the Society of Local Government Managers (SOLGM) in 2005 to ascertain their support for an academic study of some of their members. SOLGM is the professional body representing local government CEOs in New Zealand, as well as others occupying other, less senior, managerial positions within local government. Support for the research was gained in September 2005, with the fieldwork commencing in March 2006 following Massey University ethics committee approval. Details of the study were initially communicated to the SOLGM membership through a contribution to the Society's in-house publication (Asquith, 2006). SOLGM also provided two serving CEOs to act as 'mentors' on the project.

For practical purposes, the research sought to focus on the CEOs in the local authorities within the greater Auckland conurbation. This represented the geographical area covered by the Auckland Regional Council. Within this region, access was sought to all serving CEOs in local government. Access was granted to six of the eight serving CEOs in the greater Auckland conurbation. In one authority, it was suggested that the researcher seek access to the recently departed CEO, as the recently appointed incumbent felt that their limited experience in the role might impact on their contribution to the study. In one local authority access was completely denied, with 'Political pressure' being cited as the reason for the unwillingness of the CEO to participate in the research. A wider perspective of the CEO's role was also provided by six former CEOs who agreed to be interviewed for the study. Each participant was interviewed, with three key themes being explored:

- Who are the managers
 - Gender;
 - Education;
 - Career path;
 - Motivation(s).

- Internal organisational context
 - Political/managerial relationships;
 - Leadership;
 - Decision making;
 - Change strategies.
- External organisational context
 - History development;
 - The role of SOLGM;
 - Local government finance;
 - Networks.

Each participant took part in an exploratory semi-structured interview of approximately one hour's duration. Each interview was recorded on tape, and transcribed by the researcher. Given the sensitivity of the material covered by each interview, anonymity was guaranteed to each participant.

Local Government in the Greater Auckland Conurbation

As elsewhere in New Zealand, local government in the greater Auckland conurbation consists primarily of two types of authority operating independently of each other. In terms of functional responsibility, local government in New Zealand can best be described by the word used by Local Government New Zealand, the collective voice of local authorities, as 'minimal' (Reid, 2004). Services which elsewhere might be considered to fall within the local government remit, such as education, policing, social services, are all within the remit of central government in New Zealand – possibly a reflection of the size of the nation's population.

Region-wide governance is provided by the Auckland Regional Council (ARC). Like other regional councils, the ARC has essentially environmental regulatory functions. However, given the complex nature of the Auckland region, the ARC has a number of strategic infrastructure responsibilities. The second type of local government is provided by the Territorial Local Authorities (TLAs). In Greater Auckland there are seven TLAs, the four cities of Auckland, Manukau, North Shore and Waitakere, and the three districts of Franklin, Papakura and Rodney. All seven TLAs have common functions to perform, principally relating to infrastructure, resource management, building control and civil defence. In addition, Section 10 of the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA 2002) empowered all local authorities, to promote the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of communities, in the present and for the future.

The role of a local government CEO within the greater Auckland conurbation at this point is not too dissimilar to that of their colleagues elsewhere – with a similar set of statutory responsibilities to be fulfilled. However, where the role does distinctly deviate is in the scope and scale of

the strategic issues facing the greater Auckland conurbation. Some 1.3m people inhabit the region, around a third of the population of the country. The issues associated with managing urban conurbations elsewhere are found in Auckland (Barnett, 2005; Scott, 2001). Hence, along with the 'standard' local government fare, the Greater Auckland CEOs also have to manage the issues associated with a large complex conurbation. In short, the role of a local government CEO in the greater Auckland conurbation is somewhat more complex than that of their colleagues elsewhere in New Zealand.

Who are the Auckland CEOs?

The current group of eight incumbent CEOs are unrepresentative of their peers throughout New Zealand in terms of gender. Nationally, all but four CEOs are male. However, Greater Auckland accounts for three of the four female CEOs. Some of the reasons for the paucity of female CEOs are examined below in the section dealing with the CEO contractual position. As with their peers elsewhere, the CEOs were generally motivated by the so-called 'public service ethic'. In terms of education, whilst there were graduates among both serving and former CEOs, those in post were more likely to be graduates than their predecessors.

What is however interesting about those interviewed is the extent to which they have experience of managing, often at a senior executive level, in the private sector. The level of commercialisation introduced by the LGAA (No.2) 1989 is to some extent reflected in the diverse backgrounds of those former and serving CEOs interviewed. Indeed, one CEO cited the reforms contained in the LGAA (No.2) 1989 as being key to their abandonment of a career in the private business sector and the shift into local authority management. Of those interviewed, only three had not had significant commercial management experience prior to being appointed as CEO.

The researcher has interviewed in excess of 150 CEOs and second-tier local authority managers across three countries and, until the commencement of this study, had never heard remuneration cited as a reason and motivation for working in local government. However, one retired CEO specifically cited this as one of two reasons for their continued career in local government, rather than returning to the private sector where they had previously been employed. This view was something of an aberration. Indeed, one relatively new CEO indicated that they had spurned approaches from prospective employers offering salaries twice the size of their current salary. The reason for not pursuing these offers was simply that the CEO had a strong commitment to the vision being pursued by the local authority. Others interviewed went on to stress that their over-riding motivation (and that of the majority of local authority employees) was

simply to 'make a difference' to society. One CEO succinctly summed up this point:

My motivation is about creating a legacy which is a city, a region which works, which creates a quality of life, not just for this generation, but for generations to come. I get a huge kick out of being associated with decisions which shape this city and the daily lives of the people that live here.

The Role

The original role of the CEO outlined in the LGAA (No.2) 1989 has been fundamentally transformed, as was the role of local government in general by the LGA 2002. While the LGA 2002 stops short of *explicitly* stating that local government has the power of general competence, a number of commentators interpret the Act to implicitly provide such scope for operation (Bush, 2005; Reid, 2004). As such, post-2002 the CEOs have to manage relationships both within and external to the organisation (Asquith, 2002).

In the period before 1989, and the introduction of managerialist reforms in local government, each local authority's principal administrative officer required a markedly different skill set to that of CEOs in 2006. The reforms contained in the LGAA (No.2) 1989 sought a new form of managerial leadership, with a demand for CEOs schooled in the disciplines traditionally associated with the private sector. Previously, there had been a tendency for CEOs to have technical specialist backgrounds, such as engineering, and typically to have spent the majority, if not all of their careers, in local government.

This situation can be contrasted to the UK, where traditionally the senior managerial position within each local authority had been filled by someone with a legal background prior to the corporate management reforms of 1974 (Alexander, 1982). This was a reflection of the type of functions performed by local authorities. One retired CEO who was interviewed described how his previous role as a director of city works and engineering had given him responsibility for a third of all of the authority's activities. Hence, there appears to be a rise in the technocratic manager at the expense of the seasoned technical specialist. One CEO suggested that given the breadth of experience managers were able to gain in the private business sector, they were now more attuned to the managerialist themes of local government than those who had spent the majority of their careers working for local authorities.

Interestingly, this stance is in marked contrast to the situation in Ireland. Candidates in Ireland from the private business sector seeking either county or city manager (the equivalent of New Zealand CEO) positions in local

government are generally adjudged to lack the depth of experience required to make a successful local government CEO (Asquith, 1998; Asquith & O'Halpin, 1998).

Whereas the LGAA (No. 2) 1989 was seen as a watershed in terms of the way in which local authorities fulfilled their statutory responsibilities and were managed, seeking to imitate the private sector, the LGA 2002 has sought to change this position. The ramifications and importance of the LGA 2002 was described by one CEO as: 'Now we have a whole renaissance around the public service.' While this is not the place to examine in detail the content and implications of the LGA 2002, it is nevertheless important to note three of its key thrusts. First, as noted above, the Act provides local authorities with essentially the power of general competence. Second, local authorities are empowered to actively pursue a number of so-called 'well-beings' relating to social, economic, environment and culture for their community. Finally, the Act stated the importance of local government's role as an articulator of the desires and aspirations of the community. The emphasis on the wider enabling role is seen by one commentator as a reversal of the arch-managerialist reforms contained in the LGAA (No.2) 1989, and the beginning of a return to a more appropriate role for local government in New Zealand (Cardow, 2005a).

The Contract

The employment situation of the CEO laid down in the LGAA (No.2) 1989 continues to be one of enduring tension. In effect the LGAA (No.2) 1989 ends the idea of tenure of position enjoyed by their predecessors. The situation, after some legal clarification from the Auditor General, is that a CEO may be appointed on a fixed term contract of five years, which, subject to agreement by both the council and the CEO, may be extended for a further two years. This position was finally enshrined in legislation by the LGA 2002. The legal position after the LGAA (No.2) 1989 had been interpreted as one which allowed incumbent CEOs to have their contracts renewed without the post being advertised. The clarification of the law brings the terms and conditions of local authority CEOs roughly into line with those enjoyed by the CEOs of central government departments. At the end of the five-year employment contract, a local authority must, in line with the LGA 2002, advertise the CEO post. The current post-holder may apply. It was observed that if a CEO position is advertised, and the incumbent is likely to be re-appointed, then the advertisement will typically contain words to the effect of 'the current CEO will be a candidate'. This, it was argued, normally serves to discourage external applicants from seeking the position.

Views amongst those interviewed varied markedly on this contractual position. On one hand there was a feeling that in a globalised marketplace the concept of a 'job for life' was both outdated and unrealistic. The five-year contract, argued one CEO, was ultimately little more than a

performance management tool. Further, it was argued that given the commonalities between managing in the private sector in New Zealand and managing in local government, the ability of personnel to transfer across sectors with relative ease meant that there would always be a sizeable pool of suitably qualified talent from which a local authority could choose its CEO. It was also suggested that the transfer of managerial talent across the Tasman Sea, with an increasing number of Australian applicants for CEO positions in New Zealand local authorities, was an indication of the talent pool available to local authorities in New Zealand. The limitations of such a view were however expressed in terms of a declining number of senior managers who understand and appreciate the ethos and values which underpin the public sector. The seismic shift brought about by LGA 2002 has meant that purely commercial acumen and skills are no longer sufficient if CEOs are to lead local authorities in their wider governance role.

However, there was concern that the seven-year time period could have a number of negative implications for local government. Here two themes dominated. First, that very able second tier officers who enjoy tenure may be less likely to seek a CEO position because of the potential insecurity such a role offers. In addition it was argued that the relatively small number of female CEOs was a direct result of the long-term insecurity of the role – often forcing them to choose between having a career or a family. It was also argued that the relative insecurity meant that for many potential applicants for CEO positions, the plan to remain in one location for, say ten years, in order to raise a family in a reasonably stable setting were unrealistic. This was perceived as a major deterrent to many capable individuals seeking CEO positions, thereby denying local government of some of the most capable CEOs. Evidence compiled by SOLGM in July 2006 certainly indicated sympathy for this position (Wilson, 2006). Further to this, the potentially short time frame within which a CEO might be in post could mean that the fruits of their labour in terms of major infrastructure projects could well be enjoyed by the successor, or in some cases by their successor's successor.

Disquiet was also voiced that the longevity of a CEO role within a local authority may well rest solely on the whims of senior politicians, principally the Mayor. There had been examples nationally of CEOs being appointed by Mayors and councils to implement a particular agenda. A subsequent election had then seen the Mayor and supporting councillors removed from office and replaced by a group of politicians that advocated a different agenda. Indeed such was the concern about this situation that during the first 13 years after the implementation of the five-year contract, two reports by the Audit Office (1994) and the Controller and Auditor General (2002) highlighted concern about the high level of CEO turnover within local government and the reasons for this state of affairs. Whilst both reports made recommendations as to how the difficulties could be resolved, it is an interesting observation that the latter report indicated little progress had been made on the issues identified in 1994.

Further, there is a feeling that in some cases this remained an on-going issue. Indeed, one incumbent CEO stated clearly that should the TLA elections in 2007 result in a Mayor and a council which did not share the vision of the current administration and seek its implementation and development, then the CEO would not hesitate to resign. However, Howard and Sweeting (2007) are incorrect when they suggest that the situation in New Zealand is akin to that found in some US cities and elsewhere, which operate a 'council-manager executive' model, whereby the CEO or city manager is appointed by, and owes his/her position solely to, the patronage of the Mayor. The CEO is appointed by both the Mayor and the council at large.

Elsewhere, it was suggested that the era of fixed-term contracts by default meant that there would be less loyalty among the CEO cadre. Those in post would always have 'half an eye' on the future. A small number of those interviewed had held office for a considerable period of time – in one case for over 20 years. This particular CEO had worked alongside the same Mayor since the early 1980s, and the two individuals had developed a deep level of respect and understanding. Such continuity is very unusual in New Zealand. Should a CEO choose not to seek either a further two-year renewal of their contract or reapply for their post, for whatever reason, it means that someone first appointed as a CEO, at say 40 years of age, could lead four or five different local authorities before they retire. While such a situation would provide for a breadth of experience, it does not bode well for the level of institutional memory which a long-standing CEO can contribute.

Managing Politicians

By far the most critical relationship a CEO will have with those on the council is with the Mayor. As someone elected by the population at large, the Mayor lays claim to speak collectively for the citizens as a whole, and not for particular interest groups or geographical area within the council's boundaries. This position or perception was summed up by one serving CEO who described the Mayor as someone who exercised 'moral authority'. However, such a situation often leads to misunderstanding among the public at large, elected councillors, and not least among the holders of mayoral office as to the power the office is able to exercise (Cardow, 2005b). The legal position was succinctly put by one recently retired CEO who described the Mayor as nothing more than a 'titular head'.

It was further suggested that whilst the Mayor is the *external* public face and voice of the locality, it is in fact the deputy Mayor with whom the CEO will work most closely. The deputy Mayor, who is selected from amongst the councillors, it was argued, will perform the task of marshalling support for policy commitments among the councillors. As such, this role of oiling and maintaining the *internal* machinery of the political process and working alongside the CEO to ensure effective operationalisation *can* carry at least equal weight to that of the public role performed by the Mayor. This

distinction between the two roles was likened to that of a 'president' and a 'prime minister', which was further explained by one respondent as follows:

It depends on the political skills of the Mayor before they put their hand up. Most of them, if they have got any nous, will actually line up their policies and enough of the councillors to get the majority vote. When you actually look at it, the one with all the power in the local authority is the deputy Mayor because he's elected by a majority of the councillors.

However, this view of the Mayor's role was in marked contrast to the two authorities which had long-standing Mayors who were serving their fifth and eighth terms respectively. In those two authorities, it was argued that the Mayors not only enjoyed moral authority to build coalitions both within the council but also externally throughout the community. This level of stability among the political leadership was not witnessed elsewhere. What was striking about these two authorities was that they were the two which had the longest serving CEOs. Hence, both organisations had enjoyed stability on both sides of the managerial and political interface. As one of these CEOs summarised: 'The really important relationship is me and the Mayor. As long as we get on well together and work well together, I control the staff and he controls the council. At the moment we have an excellent relationship.'

There was an interesting divergence amongst those interviewed, which was more or less split between incumbent and former CEOs. Those who were now no longer in post spoke of a 'golden age' of councillors, whereby people sought election to the council in order to contribute towards the betterment of their home locality. Often, these seeking election would be of independent means and had successful careers elsewhere. There was a belief amongst the group of retired CEOs that the current position of salaried councillors had created a distinct number of elected representatives who had sought election for the wrong reason. Rather than being motivated by the desire to contribute something to their community, they had, at least primarily, been elected in order to share the spoils of office. Given that one of the key rationales for the remuneration of councillors was specifically to encourage a wider range of citizens to seek elected office, rather than those who were financially independent and secure, this would appear to be a reasoned observation. Further, a view was expressed that there is now an increasing tendency for councillors to be members of ideologically driven groups or elected on political party 'tickets', rather than seeking office in order to help shape the locality's future direction for the common good.

This view of councillors was in stark contrast to that offered by serving CEOs. While acknowledging that not all councillors were elected with the motivation of contributing towards the development of their community, there nevertheless was a feeling that the majority of councillors did share

this *raison d'être*. Further, while there were a small number of councillors within each authority who were unable to grasp that their role was akin to that of a director in a private sector company, and as such needed to focus their attention on the strategic issues facing their council, the majority were able to grasp this role. Of particular importance was the feeling that there had been a marked sea-change in the calibre of those elected to council in the last electoral round in 2004. This last intake was, generally speaking, able to appreciate the implications of the LGA 2002, and were able to articulate a vision for their authority which enabled them to pursue the opportunities afforded by the Act. Indeed, one CEO described the council elected in 2004 as a 'breath of fresh air' when compared to the previous cohort, which were described thus: 'They believed that "strategic" and "planning" were words you were never allowed to use ... Let the market dictate everything.'

Managing the Organisation

The LGAA (No.2) 1989 stated that a local authority only has one direct employee, the CEO, who in turn employs others to ensure the delivery of policy outcomes. Therefore, as the employer of local authority staff, it is up to the CEO to determine the structure of the organisation they deem sufficient in order to successfully deliver the council's policy objectives. How this is done is solely the remit of the CEO. The policy/strategic management and operational management boundaries specified in the LGAA (No.2) 1989 make this clear. Indeed, one CEO went as far as to state that apart from his own salary, which was in the public domain, the council were unaware of the remuneration structure he employed for any of his staff. This distinction was further emphasised by a number of recently appointed CEOs who described the processes involved in shaping 'their' team of (primarily) senior officers to ensure the operational effectiveness required to deliver the policies of council. However, as one recently appointed CEO noted, in appointing senior personnel, a CEO will consult senior politicians to ensure incoming managers 'fit' the organisation. The extreme of this is demonstrated by an anecdote of one newly appointed CEO from outside Auckland, who had dinner with their Mayor. At the dinner the Mayor produced a list of 20 senior managers whom the CEO was expected to dismiss at the Mayor's behest.

Another major impact of the LGAA (No.2) 1989 was the split between strategy or policy and operational matters within the organisation – the separation of steering and rowing outlined by Osbourne and Gaebler (1992). The limitations of such a clear distinction were noted, however, especially in smaller local authorities. Another primary implication of the LGAA (No.2) 1989 was the creation of local authority trading enterprises (LATES) within which all local authority trading services were placed in order to ensure that commercial management techniques were instilled into every aspect of local

authority activity. All non-trading functions tended to be transformed into business units which adopted private business sector full cost accounting systems. Hence, the local authority was required to perform the 'steering' function of service specification and contract issuing. The resulting privatisation or outsourcing of much of local government's traditional activity led to major reductions in the numbers of directly employed staff, and to a fundamental reappraisal of the role of local government within New Zealand society.

The time period since the implementation of the LGA 2002 has however seen something of a reversal in terms of the scope and scale of activity of local authorities. In their pursuit of the 'well-beings' identified in the LGA 2002, local authorities have generally increased the number of employees, a point made repeatedly by interviewees. This expansion in employee numbers has added another dimension to the CEO's role. Whereas it could be argued that the role envisaged by the LGAA (No.2) 1989 was primarily that of a manager of contracts for externalised service provision, the impact of the LGA 2002, with increasing staff numbers, means that the CEO has had to become a human resource manager too.

External Loops – Local

A number of local networks existed within which the CEOs operated. By far the most important regionally is the fortnightly gathering of the ARC and seven TLA CEOs. At this meeting regional issues are discussed and common issues identified in an environment free from political input. These meetings seek to identify and co-ordinate issues of strategic importance to the greater Auckland conurbation. A number of interviewees referred to these meetings as providing an operational basis for the bi-monthly meetings between the seven Mayors and the regional council chairperson. One former CEO sought to put this into context by stating that the Mayoral meetings amounted to nothing more than a 'morning tea group', and that the serious business on the regional local government agenda was dealt with in the CEO monthly meetings. In addition to these meetings, numerous other regional networks were identified by interviewees as being important to the way in which they performed their role.

The responsibilities contained in the LGA 2002 have transformed the ways in which local authorities perform their tasks. Whereas the era from 1989 to 2002 can best be equated with the *minimalist* enabling model advocated by Ridley (1988), the period post-2002 is one in which local authorities are able and *expected* to perform their roles in a manner more akin to the *wider* enabling role described by Stewart (1988, 1990).

The LGA 2002 gave local authorities responsibility for the pursuit of a number of 'well-beings' in the areas of culture, environment, social and economy. It is not expected that each local authority will pursue these in isolation. Rather, what is expected is that a local authority will act as a

catalyst in endeavouring to pursue policy agendas within their locality, through a network of alliances and partnerships. Given the democratic legitimacy with which local authorities operate – they are the voice of the citizens, there is an expectation that other organisations from all sectors of the economy will seek to engage with the local authority in the pursuit of the four well-beings.

Research undertaken in the UK has indicated that to be successful in striving to achieve the well-beings requires new managerial skills. Partnering can be fraught with pitfalls (Painter *et al.*, 1997) and can be costly, as the Schick Report into the NPM reforms in NZ central government highlighted (Chapman & Duncan, 2007). As such, the CEO needs to be skilled in managing relationships outside traditional organisational boundaries. To achieve such a position, the CEO must evolve into a 'competent boundary spanner' (Williams, 2002). It could be argued that, given the limited functionality of local government in New Zealand historically, the act of boundary spanning is a traditional role of the CEO. However, the fundamental change in emphasis placed upon local government by the LGA 2002 now places the skills of the competent boundary spanner much higher on the list of core competencies required to be a successful CEO.

On networking there was divergence as to what the CEO ought to do and what the Mayor's role was in the local networking arrangements. Whereas some CEOs argued that the public face of the local authority *locally* should belong to the Mayor, others disagreed. What was interesting was that there was no clear distinction between those authorities with long-serving CEOs and/or long-serving Mayors. Rather, the role taken by both the CEO and Mayor seemed to be one determined by individual personalities. An example was provided by one authority where both the incumbent and former CEO were interviewed. Whilst both individuals had worked alongside the same Mayor – who himself enjoyed a strong public presence, the former CEO had a relatively high public profile within the community. This can be contrasted with the role the incumbent CEO envisaged, with the Mayor filling the public presence vacuum created by the departure of the previous CEO.

An interesting feature of the partnering debate within Greater Auckland has been the gradual on-going shift towards shared services amongst the authorities. Across the region, libraries in the four cities and three districts work closely together. Whilst it would be incorrect to describe this as a merger between the various library services, it is nevertheless the case that there is considerable integration among the seven different services across the Auckland region. Traffic light systems too, function on a region-wide co-ordinated basis to aid the flow of road transport. On a more localised basis, there is a move towards some 'back-office' co-ordination and amalgamation between North Shore City, Waitakere City and Rodney District. The logical conclusion of such processes, assuming they can be successfully managed, could be a common service delivered by three separate 'brands' in the three localities.

External Loops – National

It had been hypothesised that SOLGM would rank highly amongst CEOs as a national network in which they would be expected to play an active role. There was however a divergence of views amongst those interviewed about the value and role of SOLGM. Some argued that since SOLGM had opened up its membership to managers below CEO rank its message was diluted. Indeed, one CEO argued that SOLGM was the professional organisation of middle managers, while another described it as a 'professional place of last resort' for a significant number of its members. It was further argued that the CEOs of the major authorities nationally sought to use the 'Metro Sector' group within Local Government New Zealand as their preferred vehicle for lobbying national government. The relatively small number of authorities that belong to the Metro Sector grouping share a number of commonalities, and as such this shared interest perspective provides a forum of more use than that offered by SOLGM. As one CEO put it, at Metro Sector meetings there was less tendency to get embroiled in discussions about cowsheds.

The view of SOLGM as having a declining influence was countered by other interviewees who included two former presidents and the current president. These individuals, and others, argued that SOLGM provides a politician-free organisation where managers at all levels are able to share ideas and concerns. Further, the education and training role fulfilled by SOLGM is often overlooked. Here, particular emphasis was placed on the development of the SOLGM Business School which seeks to provide a combination of vocational courses supported with academic rigour.

Whatever the merits or demerits of any national organisational linkages, there was an increasing trend among the incumbent CEOs that they were spending an increased amount of time lobbying on behalf of their authority's case in Wellington – often in partnership with their Mayor. Certainly within Greater Auckland, local government finance is a major political issue. Hence, major efforts are now being made by the CEOs to extract additional funds from the national government to pay for infrastructure maintenance and development in Greater Auckland. A united front amongst the CEOs there is essential if they are to successfully articulate the message that investment in Greater Auckland is in the national interest, not just that of local citizens.

Conclusion

The evidence presented above has shown that the men and women who occupy CEO positions within local authorities in Auckland are a dynamic group of individuals who are, at very least, adept at managing change. On the one hand the CEOs not only deal with the pressures of running multi-million (and in some cases billion) dollar operations which are subject to the whims of both local *and* national politicians and local electors. Alongside

this, the CEOs have also successfully led two seismic organisational transformations in the last 17 years imposed upon them by central government in the form of the LGAA (No.2) 1989 and LGA 2002 respectively. That these transformations have been performed without major service failures indicates the calibre of the CEO cadre. Indeed, in only one local authority, Rodney District, has there been organisational failure and subsequent service disruption.

In an international context, what is striking is the extent to which CEOs are able to seamlessly transfer their skills and competencies from the public to the private sectors and back again. While this is undoubtedly the result of the sweeping managerialist reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, it also says something of the adaptability and calibre of the local government CEO in New Zealand. What will be of interest is whether or not this pattern of transferability continues given the markedly different governance role of local authorities laid out in the LGA 2002.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the two referees for their comments on the article, along with the current and former CEOs who agreed to be interviewed.

References

- Alexander, A. (1982) *Local Government in Britain since Reorganisation* (London: George Allen and Unwin).
- Asquith, A. (1998) The changing nature of management in Irish local government, *Local Economy Quarterly*, 5(3), pp.4–14.
- Asquith, A. (2002) Threats and challenges affecting the CEO, in: P. Dahler-Larsen (Ed.) *Social Bonds to City Hall*, pp.101–116 (Odense: Odense University Press).
- Asquith, A. (2006) Silent leaders: the chief executive in local government, *Pulse*, March, pp.25–26.
- Asquith, A. & O'Halpin, E. (1998) The changing role of the Irish local government manager, *Administration*, 45(4), pp.76–92.
- Audit Office (1994) *The Employment of Local Authority Chief Executives* (Wellington: Audit Office).
- Barnett, M. (2005) Make Auckland a world class city, *The New Zealand Herald*, 5 October, p.A15.
- Boston, J., Martin, J., Pallot, J. & Walsh, P. (1996) *Public Management. The New Zealand Model* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press).
- Bush, G. (1995) *Local Government and Politics in New Zealand*, 2nd edition (Auckland: University of Auckland Press).
- Bush, G.W.A. (2005) New Zealand: a quantum leap forward?, in: B. Denters and L.E. Rose (Eds) *Comparing Local Governance*, pp.174–192 (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
- Cardow, A. (2005a) The construction of entrepreneurship in publicly-owned utilities in New Zealand: Local and translocal discourses, 1999–2001, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Otago.
- Cardow, A. (2005b) Mayoral power and other common misconceptions, *NZ Local Government*, 41(9), p.40.

- Chapman, J. & Duncan, G. (2007) Is there a new 'New Zealand Model?', *Public Management Review*, 9(1), pp.1–26.
- Controller and Auditor General (2002) *Managing the Relationship between a Local Authorities Elected Members and its Chief Executive* (Wellington: Controller and Auditor General).
- Dahler-Larsen, P. (Ed.) (2002) *Social Bonds to City Hall* (Odense: Odense University Press).
- Denters, B. & Rose, L.E. (Eds) (2005) *Comparing Local Governance* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
- Furness, L.A. (2002) Should I stay or should I go? A study of the factors which influence senior managers to stay or leave local government employment in New Zealand, unpublished Masters in Public Policy dissertation, Victoria University, Wellington.
- Hood, C. (1991) A public management for all seasons?, *Public Administration*, 69(1), pp.3–19.
- Howard, J. & Sweeting, D. (2007) Addressing the legitimacy of the council-manager executive in local government, *Local Government Studies*, 33(5), pp.633–656.
- Hughes, O.E. (2003) *Public Management and Administration*, 3rd edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
- Klausen, K.K. & Magnier, A. (Eds) (1998) *The Anonymous Leader* (Odense: Odense University Press).
- Laing, R.F. (2001) Do local government managers have the managerial and leadership characteristics to allow them to successfully engage in major change?, unpublished Masters in Public Policy dissertation, Victoria University, Wellington.
- Miller, R. (Ed.) (2003) *New Zealand Government and Politics* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press).
- Mouritzen, P.E. & Svava, J.H. (2002) *Leadership at the Apex* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press).
- Oshorne, D. & Gaebler, T. (1992) *Reinventing Government* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley).
- Painter, C., Isaac-Henry, K. & Rouse, J. (1997) Local authorities and non-elected agencies: strategic response and organisational networks, *Public Administration*, 75(2), pp.225–245.
- Pollitt, C. (1993) *Managerialism and the Public Services* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- Pollitt, C. (2003) *The Essential Public Manager* (Maidenhead: Open University Press).
- Roid, M. (2004) *Administrative Reform in New Zealand Local Government* (Wellington: Local Government New Zealand).
- Ridley, N. (1988) *The Local Right: Enabling not Providing* (London: Centre for Policy Studies).
- Scott, A.J. (Ed.) (2001) *Global City Regions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Stewart, J. (1988) *Understanding the Management of Local Government* (Harlow: Longman).
- Stewart, J. (1990) In search of a role, *Local Government Policy Making*, 17(1), pp.3–8.
- Williams, P. (2002) The competent boundary spanner, *Public Administration*, 80(1), pp.103–124.
- Wilson, P. (2006) Most CEs opposed, *Pulse*, August, pp.11–15.

A bullock, a monkey and Robocop: an assessment of the directly elected mayor in English local government

Andy Asquith

This article examines the implementation of the directly elected mayor (mayor) in England. Following a short examination of the history of the mayoralty, the article addresses the impact of the 2000 Local Government Act. Introduced by a reforming Blair administration, the Act sought to radically transform the ways in which local government in England operated and introduced the concept of the mayor. As we shall see, the introduction of the mayor has not been without its problems. Despite these initial teething difficulties, it has nevertheless provided opportunities to demonstrate what can be achieved by this radical innovation. Finally, the article speculates about what the future might hold given the White Paper on local government leadership that was published in late 2006.

Background

The role of mayor in English local government has been around for several centuries. Certainly in the 20th century the mayor's role within a local authority was the preserve of long-serving councillors coming towards the end of their political career. A councillor would act as the chairperson of council meetings and for their year in office, would be the area's 'first citizen': meeting visiting dignitaries, opening public buildings and making forays overseas on behalf of the local authority. The role was seen as both passive and apolitical.

It was the Conservative government of John Major that first raised the idea of the mayor in England. One of the key tasks of the incoming Major government in 1990 had been to clean up the mess resulting from Thatcher's ill-conceived policy of the Community Charge or Poll Tax. The minister charged with this role, Michael Heseltine, sought to combine his review with a more wide-ranging examination of local government structure, organisation and finance. One of the issues that the review dealt with in a consultation paper entitled *The internal management of local authorities in England* was that of the directly elected mayor (hereafter shortened to mayor) (DoE, 1991). The consultation paper examined the century-old decision-making process in local government that was centred around the committee system – principally looking at ways to divide the executive and representative roles fulfilled by elected councillors.

The idea of the mayor was quickly squashed in 1991 when there was growing awareness that a number of backbench Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs) saw the mayor as a potential threat to their own position/status within their constituency. Within local government, elected members were at best lukewarm to

Key words: mayors • local government • reform • leadership

Final submission April 2006 • Acceptance March 2007

Policy & Politics vol 36 no 1 • 39–53 (2008)

M29

the suggestion that they should lose any existing power (Hambleton and Sweeting, 2004).

Heseltine's foray into the area nevertheless sparked academic interest in the issue, which resulted in an article by Stoker and Wolman (1992) in *Public Administration*. At best, their contribution, which argued a case for at least some form of experimentation with US-style elected mayors in English local government, can be described as wishful thinking. Stoker, however, further pursued the mayor model in 1995 through the Commission for Local Democracy, a local government 'think tank', of which he was a member. It was another of these think tanks, the New Local Government Network, which finally achieved the goal of a mayor in the form of the 2000 Local Government Act. Led by the early mayoral advocate, Gerry Stoker, the New Local Government Network was a group of academics, elected councillors and local government professionals who sought to advance a different *positive, modernising* view of local government. This stance was somewhat at odds with the constraining, restricting agenda pursued by successive Conservative administrations 1979–97 (Davis, 1988; Wilson and Game, 2003).

New Labour: new local governance?

The New Labour vision for local government in England was set out in a speech by Blair in early 1998. Local authorities must, he argued, be seen as legitimate, representative, democratic institutions of relevance to the citizenry. Further, the drive towards this disciplined legitimacy would be pursued through new ways of working, principally to be achieved via local leadership and internal management reform. These new forms of internal organisation would assist in ensuring that incompetence, corruption and malaise would be routed out. Finally, those councils who were successful in signing up to the new Blairite agenda were to be rewarded with new powers and freedoms. Central to all of this would be the introduction of the mayor (Blair, 1998).

The model of mayor advocated by the New Local Government Network and the one essentially enshrined in the 2000 Local Government Act purports to be very dynamic in nature. A somewhat romantic image of a go-getting, cutting and thrusting individual serving the community at the expense of party, institutions, vested interests and self is portrayed (Randle, 2003; Orr, 2004; Sandford, 2004). Again and again, the image of Rudolph Giuliani, the former mayor of New York, was wheeled out to demonstrate the role, scope and impact that such a figure would have on local authorities in England – indeed the New Local Government Network website¹ contains pen portraits of 12 mayors from around the globe to demonstrate the virtues of the model.

To a certain extent, to advocate such a role for the mayor served to undermine what already existed within local government, and as such the role would be the 'Trojan horse' empowered to radically transform local authorities in England. The mayor model 'sold' to the nation revolved around a very presidential-style image of a person directly linked to the citizenry – a leader – yet someone above traditional local government party politics. In English local government, by far the majority of councillors – over 90% – are elected on a political party ticket (ODPM, 2005; Wheeler, 2005). However, advocates emphasise the importance of the mayor's direct

mandate from the electorate, something not enjoyed by any other actors in English local government.

Certainly, while Blair's education mantra contained promising scenarios for local government, there appears at least to be a substantial grouping within the Prime Minister's inner circle who were highly suspicious of local government's motives, capacity to act and its overall competence – a fact not helped by a number of long-running scandals in predominantly Labour-controlled authorities. There was a feeling in some quarters that the internal management of local authorities based around the committee system, which had been in place for over 100 years was, at best, past its sell by date. At worst, the system had resulted in a general public that was ambivalent to the institution of local government and the whole local democratic process. As Rallings et al (2002: 69) observed: 'Tony Blair's palpable frustration with traditional local government in Britain fuelled ministerial interest in alternative models, such as the US system of democratic elected mayors'.

Closely linked to this, was the view that a mayor would assist a local authority in its strategic development. By having a four-year term, a mayor would be free from the limitations posed on those authorities that opted for the leader with a cabinet model and which were subject to the electoral process whereby elections for a third of the elected members are held three out of every four years. Hence, no long-term planning or organisational political stability could be proffered except in those local authorities where one political party dominated activities, and then only with stable political leadership and managerial competence. Indeed, in a discussion paper, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) (2005) offers the possibility of all local authorities adopting a four-yearly electoral round for the entire local authority in an attempt to aid strategic development and planning in the policy process.

Reforming internal management

The 2000 Local Government Act proffered all local authorities in England, with the exception of those with populations below 85,000, a choice of internal management models, one of which *had* to be adopted (Rao, 2003). Status quo was simply unacceptable. The three internal management models offered were:

- *Leader with a cabinet*
This model was similar to that seen in Westminster whereby the leader of the largest political group forms a cabinet of portfolio holders around him/her. To a certain extent a number of local authorities had already adopted a form similar to this in an attempt to provide a more strategic drive to their policy-making and implementation processes. Even without the 'cabinet' element, all local authorities had an individual identified as the council 'leader'.
- *Mayor with a cabinet*
This was the government's (and the New Local Government Network's) preferred model. It entailed a mayoral election in which the entire voting populace would elect a mayor for a four-year term. Upon his/her election, the mayor would then select his/her cabinet from within the council chamber.

- *Mayor with a city manager*

The last, and perhaps the most radical, model has had very little support. It envisaged the mayor acting in a role similar to that of a company chairperson, with the city manager acting as the chief executive officer. Of all the local authorities that have trodden the mayor route, only one has taken this branch line – with a somewhat discordant result (Wilson and Doig, 2000; Shaw, 2002b).

Commenting on the 2000 Local Government Act, Lowndes and Leach (2004: 557) observe that these changes:

were intended to give expression to a new 'ideal type' of local political leadership. The vision was of a strong and individualised form of leadership, where the leader's responsibilities were more transparent than under the previous system, with an associated heightening of accountability.

It is now some seven years since the concept of mayor passed into English law. Perhaps the fears and preconceptions of the New Local Government Network towards local government and its actors have been justified. The majority of local authorities – in excess of 80% – opted for the leader with cabinet model, arguably because this offered the least radical option (Harbour and Wilson, 2003; Lowndes and Leach, 2004; John and Gains, 2005). It could be argued that either of the mayor models would take local authorities into uncharted territory.

The large number of authorities who opted to avoid the uncharted territory offered by either of the mayoral models proffered by the 2000 Local Government Act will, however, be belatedly compelled to radically transform their internal management structures if proposals published in late 2006 are legislated for. In the White Paper *Strong and prosperous communities* (DCLG, 2006), the government states that there is a clear need for stable, strategic leadership within local authorities. To achieve this goal, the government is proposing to (again) compel local authorities to adopt one of three internal management models, all of which will vest power in the hands of either an elected mayor, a leader and executive elected on a 'slate' or an indirectly elected leader. In all three models, those individuals vested with executive responsibility will serve a four-year term of office.

The rationale underpinning the proposals is to furnish local authorities with stable, longer-term leadership and concentrated executive power to provide strategic direction for the authorities, thus overcoming the short termism often associated with the current leader with a cabinet model and the potential uncertainty offered by the 1/3 electoral cycle model, whereby one third of councillors are elected annually to serve four-year terms of office in years one, two and three of the cycle, with year four being election free. As can be seen below from the discussion relating to the operationalisation of the mayoral model in Lewisham, a local authority can derive a number of benefits from the stability that such an arrangement can offer.

The road to the mayoralty

The 2000 Local Government Act provides a clear mechanism for the establishment of the mayor within a locality (ODPM, 2005). Should a local authority choose this model, a referendum has to be held on the issue – the result being binding. Assuming

a 'yes' vote in the referendum, a mayoral election has to be duly organised. Some 26 local authorities have followed this route, with a somewhat mixed set of results. Out of the 26 local authority-driven referenda, only eight have actually resulted in mayors.

Should a local authority choose status quo in internal management organisation with the leader with a cabinet model, the 2000 Local Government Act affords the citizenry the power to mobilise public support of the mayor model. If a petition can be raised with the signatures of 5% of the electorate, then a local authority is compelled to hold a referendum on the issue. Should a local authority fail to accede to the demands of such a petition, this then results in ministerial intervention to compel the authority to organise a referendum – as happened in the London Borough of Southwark (Parker, 2001). The resultant referendum provided an overwhelming 'no' vote in Southwark. Again, if a petition-inspired referendum results in a 'yes' vote, the local authority is required to organise a formal mayoral election. Such a scenario – the petition-fuelled referenda – occurred in seven local authorities, which often saw the citizenry formally opposed by the local authorities' political establishment. Despite this establishment hostility, in four out of seven cases the referenda have resulted in a mayor being elected: Bedford, Mansfield, Torbay and Stoke-on-Trent. Interestingly, Stoke-on-Trent witnessed a cross-party campaign leading up to the May 2007 elections, which aimed to compel the local authority to hold the first citizen-driven referendum in an attempt to revoke the earlier pro-mayor vote. The attempt failed to generate sufficient public support.

In almost all cases – whether for local authority- or citizenry-driven referenda – the 'no' campaign has tended to focus on two core issues. Opponents to the mayor model argue that such a move in effect circumvents the democratically elected local authority (Latham, 2002, 2003). Further, this group argue that the mayor concentrates power (at the expense of the wider local authority) into the hands of the office holder. Interestingly, one of the fiercest 'no' campaigners in the local authority-driven referendum in Watford was a Liberal Democrat councillor, Dorothy Thornhill. The citizenry in Watford voted in favour of the mayor in the referendum. The upshot of this result is that the ardent anti-mayor campaigner, Thornhill, now finds herself serving a second term of office as the directly elected mayor of Watford.

It is, however, interesting to note here that research commissioned by central government to ascertain levels of support for the concept of a mayor among the general public found results somewhat at odds with the referenda results noted above. Whereas 65% of those questioned purported to support the principle of a mayor, in actual referenda more have been won by the 'no' camp than by the 'yes' camp (Purdy and Birch, 2001; Rallings et al, 2002). As such, as the arch advocate of the mayor, Stoker, acknowledges: 'The policy can hardly be said to have had a glorious launch' (2004: 5).

The pioneers

May 2002 saw the first elections for mayors in England. These elections were held in Doncaster, Hartlepool, Lewisham, Middlesbrough, Newham, North Tyneside and Watford. A second round of elections was held in October 2002 in Bedford, Hackney, Mansfield and Stoke-on-Trent. Within local government there was clearly

much interest given that this was a flagship Blairite policy initiative. The results, however, provided a somewhat mixed bag, with Labour Party candidates winning in only three of the May electoral contests – Doncaster, Lewisham and Newham – and one of the electoral contests in October – Hackney.

The failure of Labour Party candidates was hardly the launch hoped for by mayor advocates within central government (Latham, 2002; Orr, 2004). Behind these actual results, one significant factor troubled supporters of the mayor – apparent voter apathy. Despite innovations in the electoral system and voting methods designed to increase the levels of citizen participation and voter turnout, the mayor elections failed to infuse the voting public with the desire to engage with their local authority in 2002 (Sandford, 2004). While opinion polls showed significant public support for mayors (Purdy and Birch, 2001), voter turnout in referenda and then actual elections averaged 29% each. This led Rallings et al (2002: 88) to comment: 'The level of apparent indifference must disappoint the Government'.

Despite the hopes and aspirations of the mayor advocates there has been a dearth of dashing business executives, celebrities and sports stars flocking to be mayor of their home or adopted town. Indeed, outside Greater London where Ken Livingstone is the mayor, there are only two high-profile 'celebrity' mayors out of the 12 elected since 2002, namely Stuart Drummond and Ray Mallon. It could be argued that neither of these fits the 'identikit' picture of a mayor envisaged by the New Local Government Network. Both were elected in the North East of England in distinctly uncosmopolitan towns.

In Hartlepool, Stuart Drummond stood as a 'joke' candidate in 2002 using his public persona of H'Angus the Monkey – the local football team's mascot – to campaign. Much to everyone's surprise, he, Drummond defeated the Labour Party candidate, the leader of the council, in the mayoral election by 600 votes. When he stood for re-election in 2005, Drummond had increased his majority to just under 10,000.

In nearby Middlesbrough, the 'celebrity' mayor is Ray Mallon – known as Robocop. Mallon first achieved fame as a 'zero tolerance' police commander in the area who was much courted by national politicians for his success in crime reduction. He later, however, achieved infamy when he resigned from the police after admitting to a number of disciplinary charges. To the voting public in Middlesbrough, however, he enjoys cult status. Mallon's election was no doubt aided by the fact that he enjoyed considerably more media coverage than any of his opponents (Shaw, 2002a).

The upshot of these two specific elections led one commentator to state that if the results did not cool the government's ardour for the mayor, then nothing would (Parsons et al, 2002). Stoker (2004), however, offers a somewhat different, positive view, arguing that mayoral politics offers the electorate different choices not available in party-dominated contests. Further, Parsons et al (2002: 8–9) quote the New Local Government Network thus on the first mayor election results:

They are just the result of immense disaffection and dissatisfaction over years of mismanagement and poor accountability. It was a positive statement on the part of the electorate. There is no point in introducing a new system if you elect the same people.

Away from the 'celebrity' mayors, the performance, profile and perception of the mayor are at best patchy. Despite the general doom and gloom outlined above, all is not lost in the mayor debate in England. There are examples of the model being implemented with considerable success. The London Boroughs of Lewisham and Newham are cited as exemplars of how the model can be made to work (Bullock, 2003; Quirk, 2003; Burbage, 2004; Quirk, 2006). Interestingly, senior managers from these two authorities have also held key roles in the Blairite reforming machinery in central government. The former chief executive of Newham, Wendy Thompson, departed to become the Director of the Prime Minister's Office for Public Services Reform, while Barry Quirk, the current chief executive of Lewisham, was appointed by the Treasury to work on efficiency issues with a range of public sector organisations to share and promote best practice.

The London Borough of Lewisham is a particularly interesting local authority. During the period 1979-97, apart from a brief skirmish with controversy, it was one that could be characterised as a 'good' authority. Despite being dominated by Labour-elected members, Lewisham developed a reputation as being at the cutting edge of local government reform during a period of Conservative government. A number of now mainstream initiatives, but at the time distinctly radical, were championed by Lewisham: public service orientation, commercialisation of services, public-private partnerships and the pursuit of the community leadership model. Underpinning these developments were generally solid political leadership coupled with managerial stability and capability. Unusually for a local authority, Lewisham had two councillors who could be described as 'big hitters', and who had either led or performed key leadership roles on the council for a considerable period of time from the mid-1980s onwards – Dave Sullivan and Steve Bullock (Asquith, 1994).

The mayor in Lewisham, Steve Bullock had been elected leader of the council in 1988, succeeding the other 'big hitter', Dave Sullivan. Both Bullock and Sullivan were radical reformers, transforming a traditional Weberian organisation into one with a distinct entrepreneurial flair in the pursuit of continually improving public services (Asquith, 1997). On ceasing to be a councillor in the late 1990s, Bullock maintained a high local profile in Lewisham through his role chairing the local hospital, and elsewhere through his involvement within the national local government arena.

This high profile is believed to be one of the key aspects that underpins the success of Bullock as mayor in Lewisham (private information). Certainly Bullock enjoys a higher name-recognition level and profile within Lewisham than the local MPs. While such a situation could be expected in other mayoral areas, such as Hartlepool or Middlesbrough, to enjoy such a high profile in London, with national politicians and Ken Livingstone, the mayor of London, all competing for media attention, is a remarkable achievement.

During Bullock's leadership in the early 1990s, the council had adopted a model of cabinet government to aid policy and strategy formulation, coordination and implementation. However, during Sullivan's second spell as leader in 1999, the council developed this one step further. In pre-empting the executive arrangements of the 2000 Local Government Act, the council delegated all its power to one executive committee, which, interestingly for a council, was dominated by one political party, and had representatives on it from opposition parties too. In 2000, Sullivan became the mayor of Lewisham, serving not in the traditional, passive,

apolitical role, but rather as a prototype for the role envisaged by the New Local Government Network and enshrined in the 2000 Local Government Act.

Following the referendum in Lewisham to adopt the mayor with a cabinet model, both Bullock and Sullivan threw their respective 'hats' into the ring for the Labour Party nomination. Following a very messy public contest that ended up in the courts, Bullock eventually won the nomination. He was duly elected in May 2002. Having served both as council leader (where he operated a 'cabinet' system) and as mayor, Bullock (quoted by Shaw, 2002b: 9) offers an informed insight into the distinct differences:

There is a lot more clarity. There is a lot of willingness right across the borough to make this work; starting inside the town hall but extending to our community and our partners.

I think our partners find this system actually makes more sense to them. In my first few weeks in office I have had conversations with most of our major partners in the private sector and other public service providers where they have been getting to know me, briefing me on their key issues.

Interestingly they see me as being their mayor just as much as people in the town hall see me as their mayor. That certainly isn't some thing that happens to leaders.

While cynics might suggest that given his role in the New Local Government Network, Bullock would hold such a view, the author's knowledge and experience of the state of local government in Lewisham, and in England in general, would tentatively support Bullock's view.

This major impact on the role of political leadership in Lewisham is to a certain extent mirrored by changes in the managerial leadership role fulfilled by the chief executive. The advent of the mayor has to a certain extent transferred executive authority and power away from the chief executive to the mayor. Within the organisation, there are perceived to be much clearer lines of accountability.

This clarity and transparency within the decision-making process is something that was acknowledged by the current chief executive in Lewisham in 2005 (private information). The chief executive observed that with the advent of the executive committee, the authority had found itself with one decision-making body, which eliminated a raft of other decision-making mechanisms with their attendant chief officer/committee chair power baronies. As such, the council was able to act in a much more corporate manner than it had been able to previously. However, the advent of the directly elected mayor (as opposed to the mayor role fulfilled by Sullivan) gave the whole process added democratic accountability and legitimacy. However, this level of success needs to be placed within the context of the local situation in Lewisham. Given the unusual level of political and managerial stability within the council, there is no guarantee that this success can be replicated elsewhere.

Delivered by Inquire to Swales
on 23 Jan 2008 11:43:25
C:\Users\Andy Asquith\Documents\

Issues

In those authorities that have adopted a mayor, a number of issues have been raised by commentators. While much has been written about increased and clearer accountability between the mayor and the citizenry, questions are being asked about these key issues within the local authority. Fox (2004) questions the impact that a mayor will have on the role of the chief executive – an individual legally employed by the *whole* council. Under the mayor model, the chief executive will primarily be charged with implementing the mayor's agenda – a role that might place the chief executive in conflict with the council should there be hostility between the council and the mayor over the latter's agenda. Whereas this situation might be more likely to arise in the mayor/manager model as opposed to the mayor/cabinet arrangement where there is some degree of collective responsibility, it nevertheless raises questions about the traditional apolitical role of the chief executive. Stoker (2004) offers a somewhat different view on this, arguing that for a chief executive of any local authority (and any other officer in general), there can be no higher reward than that of delivering the agenda of a democratically elected mayor. Such a task is seen as being of higher legitimacy than the delivery of a policy agenda advanced by a leader with a cabinet.

On this politicisation issue, the Audit Commission (2001), in a commentary on the 2000 Local Government Act, noted that within three years of the introduction of major reforms within local government in New Zealand during the late 1980s, less than 10 out of 85 chief executive officers remained in post. The New Zealand reforms placed considerable responsibility for the delivery of the mayor's political agenda on the chief executive in each local authority – irrespective of the realities controlling the activities of councils. As such, the situation in New Zealand thus resulted in conflict and a high turnover rate of chief executives. Could, the Audit Commission speculated, a similar pattern emerge in England in those local authorities adopting the directly elected mayor model. Further, the Audit Commission (2001) proffered the suggestion of an executive mayor akin to that found in some US cities as a future scenario.

It is interesting to note that the Audit Commission's proposal for an executive mayor has belatedly attracted support from Michael Heseltine who had first placed elected mayors on the local government agenda in 1991. In a speech to a Conservative Party conference, Heseltine suggested adopting the US executive mayoral model in the UK, and combining the roles of council chief executive and mayor (Conservative Party, 2006a). Such a move, he argued, would increase accountability and clarity within local authorities. By offering executive mayors the sizeable salaries currently paid to council chief executives, it was argued by Heseltine that local authorities would be better positioned to attract high-calibre candidates for mayoral positions. On this point the author would suggest considerable caution. In New Zealand where both mayors and councillors (often) receive considerable levels of remuneration, there is growing discontent among the citizenry surrounding the calibre of elected representatives in local government. However, it should be noted that there was no reference to this proposal in a Conservative Party (2006b) document announcing the establishment of a 'City Taskforce' to examine policy approaches to city and local government. The Taskforce was chaired by Heseltine.

Elsewhere questions have been posed about the minutiae of local government, and the negative perceptions held by the populace. Stoker (2004) cites that while there is evidence to show overwhelming public support for the mayor (Purdy and Birch, 2001), the main deterrent towards actually achieving the goal is public apathy and hostility towards the internal machinations of local government.

Further to this, Copus (2004) addresses a number of issues relating to the effective operationalisation of the mayor. Central to Copus' (2004) issues are those concerning the relations between a mayor and his/her political party grouping – where they have been elected on a political party ticket. Key to understanding this complex set of relationships are the dynamics between the role of the mayor and those of the political party grouping – specifically what would happen should the objectives clash. Whereas a mayor is elected with a community-wide remit, this may at times be fundamentally opposed to the aims and objectives of the political party group of which s/he is nominally a member. To counter such potential conflicts, Copus (2004: 588) argues that:

Local democracy needs to alter its base from one solely related to the needs and activities of political parties to one based on broader shifting coalitions of interest and alliances around issues and events of local importance and concern. The advent of elected mayors is a step in that direction.

It was acknowledged earlier that the English mayor actually has very little executive power a la Giuliani. Rather than being a 'city boss' along the lines of those personified by Richard Daley in Chicago, the limited formal power by default forces the mayor into a role akin to a broker or networker in order to achieve policy objectives. While Stoker (2004) acknowledges that this role can also be claimed by the leader in the leader with a cabinet model, it is the democratic legitimacy aspect of the mayor that clearly separates the two. Alongside this added legitimacy is the belief of clearer lines of accountability to the citizenry enjoyed by the mayor. Interestingly, Stoker (2004) argues that this direct line of accountability significantly contributes to a less partisan or controversial form of local leadership – a point made earlier by Bullock, commenting on his role in Lewisham (Shaw, 2002b).

In his analysis for the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Stoker (2004) developed a typology of the first 11 mayors – dividing them into three distinct groupings: change agents, community representatives or advocates, and finally those seeking to build on existing organisational strengths. By far the biggest of these groupings are the change agents who number six: Bedford, Doncaster, Hackney, Mansfield, North Tyneside and Watford. The rationale behind the election of these mayors is a desire on the part of the local electorate to correct the past failings of local government. Certainly a number of these authorities have had well-publicised chequered histories. Doncaster had a long-running corruption scandal that led to a number of elected councillors and officers being sent to prison. Elsewhere, both Hackney and Watford were castigated by the Audit Commission for running poor services and financial incompetence respectively. The author has firsthand experience of local politics in Bedford, where a long-running 'feud' between the county and borough councils was highly publicised in often critical prose by a local newspaper.

The proprietor of the newspaper orchestrated the mayoral referendum in Bedford and was subsequently elected mayor in October 2002 on a 'Better Bedford' ticket.

The second of Stoker's (2004) groupings were the community representatives or advocates. These were elected in Hartlepool, Middlesbrough and Stoke-on-Trent and, interestingly, all were elected as 'independents', defeating strong Labour Party candidates who had been expected to emerge victorious. Of added interest was the fact that two of these three mayors were all required to stand for re-election in May 2005. While we have already noted that Drummond in Hartlepool was re-elected, Mike Wolfe in Stoke-on-Trent was, however, heavily defeated by a Labour Party candidate. In 2002 all three were elected on the basis that they were not involved in or were seen to be above party politics. As such, all three were perceived to be able to provide a community voice free from political interference. Parsons (2005) identified six different community segments: the councillors, the chief officers; council employees; the business community, the media and the local community in general, which Mallon is seeking to engage with to achieve his mission in Middlesbrough.

The final grouping identified by Stoker (2004) were those mayors seeking to build on existing organisational strengths in their respective local authorities – the London Boroughs of Lewisham and Newham. These two local authorities have a history of management and political stability with a corresponding track record of both service excellence and innovation. As such, it could be argued that these local authorities fit the identity of model 'New Labour' local government and that, despite the presence of a celebrity mayor in the form of Ken Livingstone, the Mayor of London, they are 'delivering the goods' – both locally and nationally.

Of those authorities adopting the mayor model, two issues are most striking. First, the mayor appears to be a somewhat 'urban' in their apparent appeal. Indeed one chief executive in a very rural shire county commented that there was difficulty within the county in identifying parts of the Blairite local government agenda that was not either city- or urban-focused (private information). The second striking feature of the mayor in operation is the absence of any so-called 'core cities' from the list of mayoral authorities. In these 'regional' capitals – cities such as Birmingham, Leeds and Newcastle – there appears to be little municipal support for the concept of the mayor. While the leader of Birmingham City Council led a spirited campaign in 2001–02 to hold a referendum on the issue in the city, pressure from central government – who witnessed an embarrassing number of referenda defeats – cooled the initiative in Birmingham, and elsewhere in Bradford and Thurrock (Rallings et al, 2002; Orr, 2004).

At a seminar held in late 2006 for the 13 mayors, which coincided with the publication of the White Paper *Strong and prosperous communities* (DCLG, 2006), Blair questioned the rationale for the hostility shown towards the mayoral model within local government in both urban and rural areas (Wintour, 2006). The existing mayors, he argued, had proved both popular and successful. Further, he argued that the role of the mayors had serious implications for the operation of local democracy and community engagement. Clearly, with the publication of the White Paper, Blair envisages more local authorities moving towards a mayoral mode of operation.

Conclusion

While the picture surrounding the mayor in England is still patchy, support is beginning to emerge. In a survey of the impact of the internal management reforms on overall levels of public perception and engagement within local government post the 2000 Local Government Act, Fenwick and Elcock (2004) register a continuing degree of apathy. However, they do offer hope in the findings where they report that mayors believe that they have been successful in engaging the public in the activities of their local authority. Cynics, however, would suggest that mayors would hold that self-perpetuating view. The somewhat hazy position is optimistically summed up by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM, 2005: 14–15) thus:

The opportunity for areas to have mayors has not been taken up widely. But where local people have chosen to elect a mayor, there is evidence that they have achieved a relatively high level of public recognition. In some cases mayors have become a strong focus and force for change for things that matter most to local people, such as crime and anti-social behaviour, but they suggest more could be done if they had more powers.

Evidence from the first two rounds of mayoral re-elections in May 2005 and May 2006 would at least seem to support this view of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. There were four local authorities where sitting mayors came to the end of their initial mayoral term in May 2005: Doncaster, Hartlepool, North Tyneside and Stoke-on-Trent. In each of these mayoral elections voter turnout increased significantly. Given that one of the primary objectives for adopting the mayor model was to increase levels of community engagement and voter participation, this must surely be seen in a positive light. While opponents would argue that this increased turnout could be accounted for by the fact that a General Election was also held on the same day as the mayoral elections in 2005, it by no means follows that people voting in a General Election will also vote in a local election.

However, given the fact that the 2005 mayoral elections did coincide with the General Election, the 2006 mayoral election results may be more indicative of the success or failure of the mayoral experiment. Again, four incumbent mayors sought re-election in May 2006 – in Hackney, Lewisham, Newham and Watford. In each of these four local authorities, electoral turnout in 2006 exceeded that recorded in the inaugural round of mayoral elections. In addition, each incumbent mayor received a higher number of votes cast than in the inaugural mayoral elections. Hence, all four sitting mayors were re-elected for a second term with increased levels of electoral support.

What is of particular interest here are the results from Lewisham, where despite criticisms of the mayor's relaxed leadership style (Stevens, 2006), Bullock enjoyed increased electoral support while the Labour Party (whose mayoral candidate he was) lost control of the council for the first time in over 30 years – winning 26 out of 54 council seats. Despite this situation, Bullock still leads the council with a single-party, Labour cabinet. Arguably he is able to do so specifically because of his consensual, facilitative leadership style. This leadership style is in turn supported by robust managerial systems and a chief executive who is a strong mayoral advocate.

Delivered by Ingenta to: Swets
IP: 192.87.50.3 On: Thu, 24 Jan 2008 13:49:26
Copyright Clearance Center

Another reason for Bullock's success may lie in the fact that he is perhaps perceived to be above the traditional party politics of local government, which are often said to disengage voters and dilute the level of interest in local government among the citizenry at large. If this scenario is accurate, then Bullock could be said to have evolved into the 'model' mayor advocated by the New Local Government Network.

Despite this optimism derived from Lewisham, the author would argue that the mayoral experiment is entering its most crucial timeframe. On the one hand the government is set to drive local authorities towards an internal management arrangement that will see executive power vested in one individual – an elected mayor, an elected leader and executive or an indirectly elected leader (DCLG, 2006). However it could be argued that given previous patterns of behaviour, the majority of local authorities will opt again for the route of least change, and choose the indirectly elected leader model. One would further speculate that this will lead to additional legislation that will enforce the mayoral model on all local authorities. Against this pro-mayor drive are the attempts in a number of authorities that have adopted the mayoral model to hold another referendum to abolish the mayoral system. Attempts in Stoke-on-Trent to hold a referendum to revoke the mayoral model faltered in 2007, while attempts elsewhere in Doncaster to abolish the mayoral system also lack the required level of public support. Against this attempted anti-mayor backlash, the local newspaper in Birmingham is spearheading a petition aimed at compelling the city council to organise a referendum on the mayoral question. Should the campaign result in victory, the subsequent election of a mayor in Birmingham will be a significant act, in that it will be the first major provincial city to implement the reform.

Note

¹ www.nlgn.org.uk/public/elected-mayors/mayoral-briefing/#port

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank two colleagues, Dr Andrew Cardow and Dr Greg Clydesdale, and the two referees for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.

References

- Asquith, A. (1994) 'Change management in local government: strategic change agents and organisational ownership', PhD thesis, University of Central England, Birmingham.
- Asquith, A. (1997) 'Effecting change management in English local government', *Local Government Studies*, vol 23, no 4: 86–99.
- Audit Commission (2001) *May you live in interesting times*, London: Audit Commission.
- Blair, T. (1998) 'Prime Minister's speech to the Local Government Conference', <http://number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1156.asp>, accessed 25.10.05.
- Bullock, S. (2003) 'Tough at the top', *Local Government Chronicle*, 13 June: 16.
- Burbage, D. (2004) 'All together now', *Local Government Chronicle*, 19 March: 25.
- Conservative Party (2006a) 'Great leaders for great cities', Press Release, 7 April.

- Conservative Party (2006b) *Releasing our cities: Early questions for the cities task force*, London: Conservative Party.
- Copus, C. (2004) 'Directly elected mayors: a tonic for local government or old wine in new bottles?', *Local Government Studies*, vol 30, no 4: 576–88.
- Davis, H. (1988) 'Local government under siege', *Public Administration*, vol 66, no 1: 91–101.
- DCLG (Department for Communities and Local Government) (2006) *Strong and prosperous communities*, London: DCLG.
- DoE (Department of the Environment) (1991) *Local government review: The internal management of local authorities in England*, London: HMSO.
- Fenwick, J. and Elcock, H. (2004) 'The new political management in local government: public engagement or public indifference?', *Local Government Studies*, vol 30, no 4, 519–37.
- Fox, P. (2004) 'The implications for officers of new political management arrangements', *Local Government Studies*, vol 30, no 3: 384–400.
- Hambleton, R. and Sweeting, D. (2004) 'US-style leadership for English local government?', *Public Administration Review*, vol 64, no 4: 474–88.
- Harbour, J. and Wilson, J. (2003) 'Political management and local government: the views of local authority chief executives', *Public Money and Management*, vol 23, no 1: 51–8.
- John, P. and Gains, F. (2005) *Political leadership under the new political management structures*, London: ODPM.
- Latham, P. (2002) 'Mayoral code', *Local Government Chronicle*, 26 July: 22.
- Latham, P. (2003) 'Local democracy and directly elected mayors: the case against: a review in the context of the neo-liberal global agenda', *Local Work Debate*, vol 51, July: 4–7.
- Lowndes, V. and Leach, S. (2004) 'Understanding local political leadership: constitutions, contexts and capabilities', *Local Government Studies*, vol 30, no 4: 559–75.
- ODPM (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) (2005) *Vibrant local leadership*, London: OPDM.
- Orr, K. (2004) 'If mayors are the answer then what was the question?', *Local Government Studies*, vol 30, no 3: 331–44.
- Parker, S. (2001) 'Council forced into mayoral referendum', *Society Guardian*, 31 October.
- Parsons, E. (2005) 'Robocop goes all reflective', *Local Government Chronicle*, 18 August: 20–21.
- Parsons, E., Mahony, C. and Shaw, V. (2002) 'The weird and wonderful wield mayoral power', *Local Government Chronicle*, 10 May: 8–9.
- Purdy, D. and Birch, D. (2001) *Survey of public attitudes to directly elected mayors*, London: Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions.
- Quirk, B. (2003) 'Trying to trust a new angle', *Local Government Chronicle*, 20 June: 18–19.
- Quirk, B. (2006) 'Innovation in local democracy: the London Borough of Lewisham', *Local Government Studies*, vol 32, no 3: 357–72.
- Rallings, C., Thrasher, M. and Cowling, D. (2002) 'Mayoral referendums and elections', *Local Government Studies*, vol 28, no 4: 67–90.

Copyright © 2008, Andy Asquith
 ISBN 978 1 285 305 3 0
 IP: 192.61.30.5

- Randle, A. (2003) 'Local democracy and directly elected mayors: the case for: a lesson in strong leadership and accountability', *Local Work Debate*, vol 51, July: 1-4.
- Rao, N. (2003) 'Options for change: mayors, cabinets or the status quo?', *Local Government Studies*, vol 29, no 1: 1-16.
- Sandford, M. (2004) 'Elected mayors I: political innovation, electoral systems and revitalising democracy', *Local Government Studies*, vol 30, no 1: 1-21.
- Shaw, V. (2002a) 'First mayors take office on historic election day', *Local Government Chronicle*, 3 May: 1.
- Shaw, V. (2002b) 'The mayors are out of the lab', *Local Government Chronicle*, 5 July: 9.
- Stevens, A. (2006) 'England struggles over the concept of elected mayors', www.citymayors.com/politics/uk_electedmayors.html, accessed 24.01.07.
- Stoker, G. (2004) *How are mayors measuring up?*, London: ODPM.
- Stoker, G. and Wolman, H. (1992) 'Drawing lessons from US experience: an elected mayor for British local government', *Public Administration*, vol 70, no 2: 241-67.
- Wheeler, P. (2005) 'Talent spotting', *The Guardian*, 26 January.
- Wilson, D. and Game, C. (2003) *Local government in the United Kingdom* (3rd edition), Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Wilson, J. and Doig, A. (2000) 'Local government management: a model for the future?', *Public Management*, vol 2, no 1: 57-83.
- Wintour, P. (2006) 'Mayor run councils to get greater freedom and power', *The Guardian*, 20 October.

Andy Asquith, Department of Management and International Business, Massey University,
Auckland, New Zealand, a.asquith@massey.ac.nz

Downloaded by: Steve
 Date: 24 Jan 2016 13:40:26
 Content not for sale